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Peace must be restored in Aceh 
Following the breakdown of talks between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement, 
GAM, Jakarta declared martial law in Aceh on 19 May. All-out war has been raging since then, with 
casualties mounting by the day. Tens of thousands of villagers have fled their homes and hundreds of 
schools and other public amenities have been burnt down. Aceh is now under strict military control, 
independent press access has been curbed and the whole province is effectively isolated and sealed off. 
The people of Aceh are today living in what can only be 
described as a living hell, a daily round of trauma and 
extreme fear, of sweepings of villages, of the seizure of 
people at random and, hours later, their bodies left lying by 
the roadside. 
A week after martial law was declared, a foreign journal-
ist reporting from Seunade, in the district of Pidie, 
described how 'three men were gunned down as they 
walked home after harvesting rice in the paddy fields. The 
following day, the soldiers returned and dragged two men 
out of their houses, shooting them dead in front of their 
terrified families'. According to villagers, one of the three 
men was a GAM member but was unarmed while the other 
two were farmers. 
One of the two men killed on the following day had tried 
to escape through his bedroom window but was stripped 
and beaten on the dusty track outside his house. Nurbaiti, 
the widow of one of the men, married her husband two 
months ago. Her first husband was killed by the TNI, the 
Indonesian armed forces, two years ago. 
The people of Seunade, the journalist continues, 'are 
petrified after the recent killings. They dare not venture out 
to work in the fields and the crop of red chillies ripe for 
harvesting has been left to rot.' 
She writes that 'both the military and GAM are feared by 
the Acehnese. Both are involved in extortion and drug-
running and both harass and intimidate civilians. But there 
is little doubt that the TNI excites greater dread.' [Kathy 
Marks in The Independent, 26 May 2003] 
Hundreds of people are known to have been killed in the 
first month of martial law, but anything approaching an 
exact figure is difficult to establish. Although the military 
authorities claim that all those killed are 'GAM suspects', 
this is clearly a fabrication. 
Accord sabotaged by the military 
When the Cessation of Hostilities (COHA) accord was 
signed on 9 December 2002, the prospects for a peaceful 
solution in Aceh appeared for the first time to be bright. The 
accord allowed for the presence of international monitors, 
along with monitors from the two sides to check on imple-
mentation. The Indonesian side undertook to halt offensive 
actions and pull back their troops to defensive positions 
while GAM agreed to place their weapons in storage, 
beyond use. The tripartite monitors were organised in Joint 
Security Committees (JSC) which set up local offices. 
COHA also provided for the creation of 'peace zones' and 
for a couple of months, several such zones were identified. 
However, although the accord had its advocates within 
the Megawati government, the military in Aceh and top 
ranking officers in the Indonesian armed forces, the TNI, 
were clearly unhappy and soon began to sabotage the agree-
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ment. By early March this year, JSC local offices were 
being attacked by mobs organised by the military; some of 
their premises were heavily damaged and several officials 
were wounded. This forced the Henry Dunant Centre, the 
Geneva-based conflict resolution organisation which had 
brokered the accord, to order the closure of the offices and 
the withdrawal of monitoring personnel to Banda Aceh, 
which was a serious setback for peace. 
On 10 April, Minister-Coordinator for Political and 
A combined force of Army, Navy, Airforce and Police 
arrived in Aceh by mid May 
Security Affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who had 
initially favoured the accord, announced that Indonesia was 
ready to launch military operations in Aceh and was prepar-
ing to use 50,000 troops . Lt-General Bibit Waluyo, 
commander of the army's strategic command, KOSTRAD, 
said he would be sending hundreds of reinforcements to 
Aceh 'to crush GAM', while Major-General Sriyanto, 
commander of the special forces, Kopassus, said that two 
Kopassus battalions, about 1,600 men, had just been 
dispatched to Aceh. 
At the end of the month, Yudhoyono again took the stage, 
announcing that Indonesia was issuing a two-week ultima-
tum to GAM to accept special autonomy and to agree that 
Aceh would 'remain within the fold of the Unitary State of 
the Republic of Indonesia'. Although COHA was still 
acknowledged as being the framework, these demands went 
far beyond the terms of the accord which did not deal with 
seeking a political solution and referred to special auton-
omy only as 'the starting point' for the talks. 
As a further sign of bad faith on the Indonesian side, five 
members of the GAM negotiation team . were arrested in 
Aceh Besar in early May as they were leaving their hotel. 
They were later released. However, when they were due to 
leave for Tokyo to attend a meeting of the Joint Security 
Council , they were held again by the Indonesian police and 
prevented from leaving to attend the talks. The Indonesian 
authorities announced that they would face charges of trea-
son, in total disregard of their legitimate status as negotiators. 
International community's duplicitous position 
While western powers have promoted th~ talk~, t~ey also 
take the position that Indonesia's territorial mte~nty is p~ra­
mount, a position that justifies Indonesia'~ pohc_Y of tak~ng 
whatever action it considers necessary, mcludmg wagmg 
war, to prevent the break-up of the Republic. It _is a position 
that Indonesia's military leaders have used to their advantage. 
Throughout the talks process, western govemrne~ts and 
agencies, including the US, Japan, the European Union and 
the World Bank, held several meetings in Tokyo to press for 
a peaceful solution and met several times in Tokyo. They 
had announced their decision to fund a programme of 
reconstruction to Aceh, amounting to $40 million. 
But with nationalist sentiment so deep-rooted among 
Indonesia's political leaders, there was shock and horror at 
the internationalisation of the Aceh conflict. Far from 
acknowledging the positive role of the Henry Dunant 
Centre in trying to resolve the conflict peacefully, there 
were expressions of dismay that a foreign agency regarded 
as a useless NGO had intervened and calls for it to be 
excluded from further involvement in Aceh. 
As violations of the accord on both sides mounted, it was 
apparent that the body set up under COHA to _act as fi~al 
arbiter regarding serious disagreements, the Jomt Secunty 
Council, would have to convene. After disagreements over 
the date and location, the Council eventually met in Tokyo 
on 17 - 18 May, under pressure from the Tokyo Group. 
Weeks before these talks, the Indonesian armed forces had 
announced the immediate dispatch of heavy military equip-
ment and thousands of reinforcements to Aceh, in anticipa-
tion of intensified military operations, hardly a good omen 
for the talks. Included among the equipment being prepared 
for Aceh were four British-made Hawk ground attack 
aircraft and Scorpion tanks, also from the UK. 
Far from seeking to pave the way to an agreement, the 
Indonesian delegation, after lengthy consultations with 
Jakarta, presented a series of demands that they knew would 
be unacceptable to GAM. They demanded that GAM 
should accept special autonomy as the final solution, that it 
should abandon its demand for independence and that it 
should disband its armed forces. As a spokesman for HDC 
at the talks said later, 'The government put forward addi-
tional conditions (which) made any discussion or dialogue 
impossible.' [Jakarta Post, 28 May 2003] Yudhoyono also 
said that a military operation would commence if GAM 
refused to accept the conditions. Predictably, the talks broke 
down. On the following day, 19 May, martial law was 
declared in Aceh and renewed military operations began. 
With a few rare exceptions, Indonesian politicians have 
not spoken out against the imposition of martial law. The 
only prominent public figure to express concern has been 
Ahmad Syafii Maarif, the chairman of Muhammadiyah, a 
Java-based organisation with millions of members. Unlike 
the other mass Muslim organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama, the 
Muhammadiyah also has a sizeable following outside Java. 
Fearing the damage that operations could inflict on the 
population, he urged the military to halt its operations. 'We 
have seen that even with a military operation, the GAM 
separatist movement cannot be beaten easily.' He warned 
that as casualties mounted, 'the people of Aceh will become 
more anti-government, although they may not be supporters 
of GAM.' [Jakarta Post, 3 l May 2003] 
Strict control of the press under martial law 
Already weeks before martial law was proclaimed in Aceh, 
the military authorities issued a number of warnings to 
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Indonesian journalists regarding their reporting of the situ-
ation in Aceh. Several dozen Indonesian journalists who 
were accredited to report on the war in Aceh were required 
to undergo a four-day course of strenuous military training 
and were told that they would be required to wear military 
clothing which, as GAM later warned, would put them in 
the line of fire. Accredited journalists would be embedded 
with the troops and would be required to check their reports 
with the military authorities. 
Further restrictions on the press were announced on 21 
May by Major-General Endang Suwarya, commander of the 
regional military command in Aceh and now also the offi-
cer in charge of implementing martial law in Aceh. Citing 
legislation governing states of emergency, Suwarya banned 
journalists from quoting GAM spokespersons for the dura-
tion of the state of emergency. The general said 
Indonesia's interests must be paramount in all press 
coverage. 'I demand that all news reports support the 
nationalist spirit. The interests of the unitary state must 
come first. No credibility may be accorded to the 
GAM's statements, which constantly twist the facts,' 
Suwarya said. 
Protesting against the restrictions, AJI, the Alliance of 
Independent Journalists, said: 'The media's credibility 
and journalists' safety in conflict areas can only be guar-
anteed if there is fair and impartial coverage, not one-
sided propaganda.' 
Within days of martial law, several news organisa-
tions encountered problems. Soldiers threatened 
reporters from the privately-owned television station 
Metro TV with expulsion from the province because 
they filmed a group of persons with GAM logos on ~~' 
their clothes. The people concerned were helping to ~;..1 
put out a fire at one of the many schools that have been ' 
torched since the start of the army's offensive. The local 
daily newspaper Serambi Indonesia also received a strong 
reprimand for alleged bias in favour of the separatists in its 
coverage of the military operations. 
One of Indonesia's leading dailies, Koran Tempo, which has 
made every effort to report developments in Aceh, will face 
legal proceedings by the army for publishing 'incorrect 
reports' about the killing of ten civilians during a raid in the 
first week of martial law. The article was based on a report by 
AFP which, the military warns, could also face legal action. 
The report that triggered the army's fury was headed: 
'Civilians have started to become victims'. The article 
reported a raid that led to the deaths of ten civilians includ-
ing a thirteen-year old boy in the village of Matam 
Mamplang, in the district of Bireuen. According to the 
report, an 87-strong unit led by Captain Mahfud Supriadi 
shot the civilians during a search for GAM guerrillas. The 
ten victims were guarding a shrimp farm at the time of the 
raid and were told to stand in a row, then shot, one by one. 
[Jakarta Post, 28 May 2003] 
During the first week of martial law, a number of foreign 
journalists went to Aceh and were able to file reports giving 
extensive coverage in British, Dutch and Australian news-
papers. However, Kathy Marks of The Independent in 
London, said in one of her articles that she had been 
subjected to lengthy questioning by the military while she 
was gathering her information. 
But as we went to press, the position of foreign journal-
ists in relation to Aceh was unclear. Although no ban had 
yet been announced regarding foreign journalists and 
foreigners in general, the martial law commander turned 
ACEH 
down applications from 10 foreign-based journalists to 
report from the province, stating that there was 'no need for 
foreign observers' in Aceh. 
UN Secretary-General expresses concern 
On 28 May, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, issued a statement saying that he was 'deeply 
concerned' over the impact on the civilian population of 
renewed hostilities in Aceh. He said he was disturbed by 
reports of extra-judicial killings and the widespread burning 
of schools. He urged all parties to the conflict to uphold 
their obligations to protect civilians in armed conflict, and 
called on the Indonesian government to 'ensure the neces-
sary security conditions to allow international aid organisa-
tions safe and unhindered access to affected populations.' 
Summary executions 
During the first week of martial law, hundreds of school 
buildings were burnt down. Both sides deny that they were 
responsible for these acts of destruction while it is clear that 
the troops did nothing to prevent these acts of arson. 
A number of international aid and humanitarian agencies 
have been working in Aceh for several years. They include 
UNICEF, Oxfam and Peace Brigades International. The PBI 
provides protection for human rights activists. They too 
have been placed under severe restrictions. 
Yusuf Kalla, the minister for social affairs, announced that 
international aid agencies operating in Aceh would be 
required to conduct their activities in collaboration with the 
government which, under martial law, means in effect with 
the military. Here too, as with the press, the martial law 
authorities have indicated that foreign aid agencies will be 
prohibited from operation in Aceh, but as yet, they have not 
been forced to leave. However, with security conditions 
along the highways so hazardous, aid workers are in effect 
only able to operate in Banda Aceh. 
Casting doubt on the motives of the aid agencies whose 
purpose in Aceh has always been humanitarian, foreign 
minister Hassan Wirayuda said that the government should 
be 'extra cautious' about the activities of international agen-
cies in Aceh as 'there are questions about the sincerity of 
these organisations in helping the Acehnese, especially non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), which could have 
other motives or might support GAM.' 
Wirayuda said the government did not want to be bothered 
by the unnecessary presence of foreigners in the province, 
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which might disrupt the military operation in Aceh. Yet he 
knows only too well that the true purpose of the martial law 
authority is to close Aceh off to outside observation. 
Diplomatic spat with Sweden 
Meanwhile, the Indonesian government has been engaged 
in a fruitless attempt to persuade the Swedish government 
to take legal action against GAM leaders who have been 
living as refugees in Sweden for many years. The govern-
ment has sent several 
missions to 
Stockholm but have 
been told that no 
action can be taken 
against the Acehnese 
refugees who were 
now living in Sweden 
as Swedish citizens 
and have committed 
no crimes under 
Swedish law. They 
include Hasan di Tiro, 
head of the Aceh-
Sumatra National 
Liberation Front, Dr 
Zaini Abdullah, 
Bachtiar Abdullah 
and other top-ranking 
ASNLF members 
whom Jakarta would 
dearly like to get their 
hands on. 
In the current 
atmosphere in Indonesia, Swedes have become targets and 
for a few days, the Swedish embassy in Jakarta was closed. 
Komnas HAM visits Aceh 
The National Human Rights Commission, Kornnas HAM, 
quickly made known its intention to visit Aceh for the 
pury>oses of conducting an investigation. In early June, a 
team of five members, headed by MM Billah, spent four 
days in the region. On its return to Jakarta, they announced 
that they had been able to gather information from a large 
number of witnesses. 
Clearly infuriated by military moves to gag the team, 
Billah arrived at the press conference in Jakarta 
with his face covered by a black cloth. The team 
said their purpose had been to carry out a prelimi-
nary investigation only and a fact-finding mission 
would be dispatched to Aceh very soon. They had 
found evidence of six types of violations: the 
burning of school buildings, the summary killing 
of civilians, arbitrary arrests, torture of unarmed 
civilians, sexual harassment and abuse, and forced 
displacement. 
Billah also told the BBC that they had heard 
credible evidence of the existence of mass graves 
containing dozens of bodies in the district of 
Bireuen. Billah said that the team had heard many 
reports about the recruitment and training of mili-
tias by the army. This statement in particular 
incurred the wrath of the armed forces commander 
in chief, General Endriartono Sutarto. The training 
of militias is in the tradition of army practices in 
East Timor in the months before and after the 
referendum there in August 1999. These were the gangs 
who caused such havoc and destruction there. 
Army chief of staff, General Ryamizard Ryacudu, chal-
lenge the team to return to Aceh 'when we will knock their 
heads off. He accused the Commission of falsification and 
said that they should produce their witnesses and have them 
repeat their testimonies in the presence of the authorities. 
He has also threatened the Commission that the army will 
take out legal proceedings against it if it fails to provide 
convincing proof of its 'allegations'. 
Meanwhile, the Indonesian Red Cross announced that 
they had found no fewer that 151 corpses in various parts of 
Aceh and taken them to hospitals and morgues. The organ-
isation was not in a position to identify the bodies or to say 
how they had died but said that they had all been dressed in 
civilian clothing. 
According to a report from contacts inside Aceh, volun-
teers of the Red Cross had seen abotit fifty bodies 'littering 
the road' in the sub-district of Sawang, North Aceh and a 
similar number of bodies on the road near Krueng Tuan, 
also in North Aceh, but their efforts to move the bodies had 
been hampered by the security forces . 
Human rights activists rounded up 
Although there have been a number of bitter armed 
clashes between the Indonesian army and GAM units, it is 
civil society that has borne the brunt of the clampdown in 
Aceh. Shortly after the imposition of martial law, 14 
students were arrested in Banda Aceh. Although most were 
later released, they are all required to report regularly to the 
authorities. It is difficult to keep track of the arrests and to 
know the actual number of people currently being held. 
Early on, a well-known woman activist, Cut Nur Asikin, 
who recently set up a new women's organisation, Srikandi 
Aceh, was arrested and as far as is known in still being held. 
Three weeks later, on 7 June, a number of activists were 
arrested in East Aceh. They include Mohammad Yusuf 
Puteh, chairperson of a human rights organisation, FP-
HAM in East Aceh, Nursyamsyiah a staff member of FP-
HAM who is also director of PHIA, Acehnese Women's 
Empowerment Movement, Nadariah who is also on the staff 
of PP-HAM, and Marnus, a volunteer working for the 
Indonesian Red Cross. Two days earlier, Kerun, a volunteer 
for the Red Cross, was abducted and later found to be being 
held by the police. On 8 June, Fitri, an activist from Forum 
Rakyat Aceh, was summoned to appear at police headquar-
ters where he was questioned, then promptly placed under 
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The Attorney General's office in Jakarta has announced 
that 18 Acehnese will be prosecuted in court, including the 
GAM negotiators who will be charged with treason and 
terrorism under articles in the Criminal Code in which the 
maximum penalty is death. The police in Aceh have said 
that the others who come to trial are likely to be charged 
with subversion, for which death is the maximum penalty. 
The martial law authority has also announced that prepara-
tions are underway for the establishment of an island prison 
on Pulau Nasi, south-east of Sabang, off the northern tip of 
Aceh, for the incarceration of the hundreds of detainees. 
This follows the tradition of island prisons well established 
during the days of the Suharto New Order. In the 1960s and 
1970s there was Nusakembangan prison off the coast of 
Central Java and then the notorious Bum Island concentra-
tion camp where tens of thousands of alleged communists 
were held for up to fourteen years without trial. Hundreds 
of East Timorese were held on the island of Arauro, north of 
Dili, in the 1980s. 
Acehnese communities outside A.ceh are also being 
targeted and are being placed under constant surveillance. 
The governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso announced in May that 
eighteen Acehnese communities in Jakarta are being moni-
tored for signs of support for GAM. These communities 
consist of tens of thousands of families. All in all, being an 
Acehnese in Indonesia means being the target of what can 
only be described as 'racial discrimination'. 
Massive population displacement 
A key element in the army's strategy in its war against the 
people of Aceh is the organised re-location of huge numbers 
of villagers. When the presidential decision on martial law 
was announced, it was also stated that between 100,000 and 
200,000 Acehnese would be 're-settled' in camps for inter-
nally-displaced people. The declared intention is to separate 
the people from GAM, in an attempt to undermine local 
support for the movement. 
Over the years, many thousands of Acehnese have been 
fleeing their villages as their villages were subjected to 
sweepings by the military or in order to avoid being caught 
up in the fighting. But as a general rule, the IDPs were later 




put into effect, this re-location will become permanent. At 
present there are thought to be about 25,000 IDPs in various 
parts of Aceh. 
It has also been announced that all civil servants in Aceh, 
said to total more than 67,000 people, will be screened to 
determined whether they are supporters of GAM. In early 
June, 78 village heads announced that they had resigned 
their posts because they could not cope with the difficulties 
they now face. It seems that they, along with many other 
village heads, will be replaced in most if not all cases by 
army officers, further intensifying the extent and depth of 
militarisation in Aceh. 
Human rights NGO attacked in Jakarta 
The office in Jakarta of Kontras, the Commission for the 
Disappeared and Victims of Violence was attacked on 28 
May by a group of about one hundred men, clad in military 
fatigues. Kontras is one of a small number of Indonesian 
NGOs in Jakarta that has been outspoken in its condemna-
tion of the declaration of martial law and the war now 
underway in Aceh. 
General Endriartono commented later that the organisa-
tion only had itself to blame because of its advocacy on 
behalf of victims of abuse. He said: 'This (the attack) is a 
negative excess, perhaps by people who just got tired of 
Kontras, who always have negative perceptions about the 
government's actions,' he said. 'While it may be true that 
attacking the organisation is against the law, maybe they 
(Kontras) should look at themselves in the mirror.' [Jakarta 
Post, 29 May 2003] 
The attack was organised by Pemuda Panca Marga, a 
nationalistic group whose members are the children of 
veteran soldiers. Outside the Kontras office, they said they 
were looking for Munir, founder of Kontras and now exec-
utive director of Imparsial, a human rights watchdog group. 
The attackers turned violent and vandalised office equip-
ment, as well as physically assaulting members of staff, 
none of whom sustained serious injury. Ori Rachman who 
heads the Kontras presidium, complained that no police 
arrived on the scene, even though they had been informed 
of the attack. Police arrived later, saying they had been in a 
meeting at the time. 
The attack was strongly condemned by MM Billah of the 
National Human Rights Commission who described it as a 
'serious crime' against an organisation with a legal mandate 
to help ensure better rights protection for all people. 
In an editorial on 29 May, The Jakarta Post said that those 
who launched the attack maintain that 'no one should speak 
up against the war in Aceh, or should do so at the peril of 
being called a traitor of the "patriotic" and "nationalistic" 
cause.' 
The attack was also condemned by the Friends of Islam 
Civil Society, whose coordinator, Rizaldin Kurniawan 
described it as a serious threat to law enforcement and to 
people's criticism of state violence. This organisation 
consists of several organisations under the aegis of the main 
Muslim organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah. [Jakarta Post, 31May2003] * 
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International hulllanitarian intervention 
The Declaration of Martial Law in Aceh (Keppres No 2312003) which took effect on 1~ May 200! 
is based on Law No 2311959 regarding States of Emergency. It stipulates that all power tn the t~~rt­
tory shall be in the hands of the Regional Martial Law Authority ('Penguasa D~rurat ~1.ltter 
Daerah ~. These powers are vested in the Commander of the Iskandar Muda Regwnal M1l1tary 
Command, Major-General Endang Suwarya. 
On 25 May, the following document was sent by TAPOL 
to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
and to the Greek government holding the presidency of the 
European Union: 
The military's powers under Martial Law are: 
1. Control of all means of communication, including 
radio and telephone. 
2. Shut down public and private facilities . 
3. Prohibit the distribution of goods within the territory 
of Martial Law. 
4. Carry out surveillance by land, sea and air. 
5. Prohibit all forms of information, including publica 
tions, public announcements and visual material. 
6. Intercept and destroy private letters, as well as prohibit 
the transfer of money into the territory where 
Martial Law is in force. 
7. Control and ban all media publications. 
8. Remove, detain or prohibit inhabitants from leaving 
the territory. 
9. Promulgate regulations as required. 
10. Order civilian inhabitants to assist in military opera-
tions. 
11. Detain persons for up to twenty days without charge, 
whereas arrests shall be reported after 14 days. The 
period of detention may be extended to fifty days, 
if necessary. 
In support of military operations in Aceh, the security 
forces have announced that they will bring their strength up 
to 50,000 men. When Martial Law was proclaimed, It stood 
at 28,000 military and 10,000 police, but additional troops 
are being flown in every day. 
There has been a daily increase in the level of violence 
since Martial Law took effect. While armed skirmishes 
between the TNI and GAM forces are being reported daily 
with casualties on both sides, far more casualties have been 
inflicted on civil society. All the available evidence suggests 
that GAM forces are not the main target and can in any case 
easily melt into the forests. The violence has been directed 
primarily against the civilian population. The military have 
stated that one of their counter-insurgency tactics will be to 
'separate the civilian population from the rebels'. This 
appears to be being done with a vengeance. However, with 
all activities throughout the territory now under tight mili-
tary control, it is no longer possible to conduct investiga-
tions into reported cases of violence. 
In many places, identity cards have been confiscated. The 
Martial Law Authority is now planning to replace the 
current identity card with a new one as a way of seeking to 
identify alJeged GAM sympathisers. 
NGOs and CSOs targeted 
A number of non-governmental organisations and civil 
society organisations - NGOs and CSOs - have been 
pronounced unlawful [see editors' note at end] by t.he 
Martial Law Authority and their activists threatened with 
arrest. They include Kontras-Aceh (an Aceh-based human 
rights monitoring organisation), SMUR, a students' organ-
isation SIRA, a mass organisation that campaigns for a 
' . . 
referendum in Aceh, FPDRA, an inter-sectoral orgamsat10n, 
Forum Rakyat or People's Forum, an inter-sectoral organi-
sation, Perempuan Merdeka, the Independent Women's 
organisation, ORPAD, the Acehnese Democratic Woi_nen's 
Organisation, and others. Major-General Endang said he 
has received a number of names from military intelligence 
which he will use as the basis for making arrests . 
Monitoring activities have come to a halt because human 
rights defenders, including the many activists and volun-
teers spread across Aceh who are working for Kontras, have 
gone into hiding. 
Major-General Endang said on 20 May that he had 
received a list of names from military intelligence which he 
will use as the basis for making arrests. This list is under-
stood to include six hundred names of persons who have 
been placed on the 'wanted' list, on suspicion of having 
connections with, or being sympathetic with GAM. The 
number of activists already arrested is not known. The first 
person known to be detained was Cut Nur Asikin, a well-
known woman activist of the women's organisation, 
Srikandi Aceh. Johnson Panjaitan, a lawyer from Jakarta, 
went to Banda Aceh to see her but was refused access. 
Late on Saturday night, 24 May, fourteen students were 
arrested during a raid on their student hostel in Banda Aceh. 
An unknown number of activists have gone into hiding 
while their chances of leaving Aceh are remote. This poses 
problems about their personal upkeep as well as their secu-
rity. Indonesia's minister-coordinator for social affairs, 
Yusuf Kalla, has said that foreign NGOs will be prohibited 
from operating any longer in Aceh. 
Territory closed 
The whole territory of Aceh is now closed to contact with 
the outside. Public transport is barely functioning and a 
number of activists need to be evacuated as quickly as 
possible for their own safety but exit facilities are not avail-
able. All roads out of Aceh across the border with North 
Sumatra are patrolled by the security forces. Airports are 
also under tight military control. Hence the chances of 
anyone leaving is very remote. All means of traffic or 
movement out of Aceh are under military control, and 
movement into other parts of Sumatra is being watched; this 
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includes South Sumatra, Lampung as well as North 
Sumatra. It also includes Riau, Jakarta and West 
Kalimantan. Security operations underway in other parts of 
Indonesia are aimed at ensuring that no Acehnese will be 
able to leave the territory and find sanctuary anywhere else 
in Indonesia. 
The operation is code-named, Tegak Rencong or 
'Enforcing Rencong' (a traditional Aceh weapon). The mili-
tary blockade imposed between Aceh and North Sumatra is 
having grave economic consequences as the supply of basic 
foodstuffs has been severely affected. The people of Aceh 
now face a serious food crisis, further exacerbated because 
villagers are too fearful to leave their homes in order to till 
their land or gather food. There is also a crisis in the supply 
of medicine and fuels. We have noted that the UN has 
expressed concern about the looming humanitarian crisis in 
Aceh. 
Acehnese communities under surveillance 
A close watch is now being imposed throughout Indonesia, 
especially where Acehnese communities are located. On 24 
May, the governor of Jakarta, Sutiyoso, announced that the 
security forces and police were carrying out surveillance on 
eighteen locations in the capital where Acehnese communi-
ties are living. Tens of thousands of Acehnese families now 
fear that they may be accused of being sympathetic to GAM 
but the system of surveillance will also make it impossible 
for Acehnese who manage to flee their towns and villages 
to take refuge elsewhere in Indonesia. This is being repli-
cated in other cities and towns in Indonesia where Acehnese 
communities reside. 
Acehnese now fear that as a distinct ethnic group, they are 
being discriminated against, with severe consequences for 
their survival. 
In the first three days of Martial Law an estimated 300 
schools were destroyed by fire. None of the perpetrators has 
been identified while GAM and the security forces have 
blamed each other for these acts of arson. Reports that have 
been received from contacts suggest that both sides are 
involved but apportioning the blame will not be easy. The 
destruction of schools has added to the sense of fear, intim-
idation and powerlessness among the inhabitants; some 
foreign media reports have hinted that local villagers know 
who the perpetrators are but are too scared to say. 
Door-to-door sweepings are underway in many parts of 
the province with a large number of troops being used in 
these operations. Villagers have been traumatised by intru-
sions into their villages by security forces equipped with 
heavy military equipment, including armoured personnel 
carriers or tanks. The effect on the population has been terri-
fying and thousands of families have fled their villages to 
seek refuge in 'internally displaced persons' centres. 
According to Serambi Indonesia on 24 May, 23,000 IDPs 
have taken refuge in schools and mosques. The Indonesian 
authorities have made no secret of the fact that they expect 
tens of thousands of Acehnese to need 're-location' as IDPs; 
the ministry of social affairs has been allocated a special 
budget to handle 100,000 to 200,000 Acehnese who will 
need to be 're-located'. 
There have been many reports of executions by the secu-
rity forces, who claim that the victims are members of 
GAM, but none of these executions can be independently 
verified or the circumstances of the executions checked. 
Villagers who have seen executions are too afraid to speak 
to anyone about the killings. In cases where a journalist may 
report evidence from villagers, the security forces would 
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then force a confrontation with the witnesses who cannot be 
expected to repeat their testimony in the presence of the 
security forces. 
The Martial Law authorities have imposed a tight control 
over the Indonesian media. On May 20, Major General 
Endang Suwarya warned journalists that they should neither 
publicise statements issued by GAM leaders nor carry news 
that supports the separatist cause. 'There should be no 
reports from GAM and no reports that praise GAM', 
Suwarya said, according to Agence France-Presse. The 
major general also ordered journalists to adjust their cover-
age. 'I want all news published to contain the spirit of 
nationalism. Put the interests of the unitary state of 
Indonesia first,' he said, according to The Jakarta Post. He 
announced that he will soon issue rules governing press 
coverage, adding that all journalists will have to be accred-
ited by the military command in Aceh. Foreign print media 
and radio journalists have made a number of reports from 
Aceh since the imposition of Martial Law but it remains to 
be seen whether the rules governing press coverage will 
seek to restrain further foreign reporting. 
GAM statements are available on the Internet along with 
reports of executions, arrests and other atrocities from 
GAM sources. However, none of this can be independently 
verified. 
Humanitarian intervention needed 
A number of western governments, including a group of 
donors (Japan, the US, the EU and the World Bank), have 
agreed to provide development aid for Aceh. These govern-
ments and international agencies, along with the United 
Nations, should now persuade the two sides to return to the 
peace process. They should together spearhead a move by 
the international community to : 
1. Call for the immediate lifting of Martial Law and call 
on the two sides to return to the negotiating table. 
2. Call for an end to hostilities and an end to attacks on 
public property by both sides. Both sides should be urged to 
commit themselves to protecting public property. 
3. Call for full protection for all non-combatants, espe-
cially human rights defenders and all other activists associ-
ated with human rights NGOs and other civil society organ-
isations and call for an end to the targeting of civil society 
organisations. 
4. Call on the Indonesian authorities to end the re-loca-
tion of Acehnese into IDP camps and to lift all restrictions 
on the movement of Acehnese into and out of Aceh. 
5. Call.on the Indonesian authorities to lift all restrictions 
on the media and end the policy of obligating Indonesian 
journalists to conform with the aims of military strategy. 
6. Undertake joint action through the EU and the UN for 
immediate humanitarian assistance to Aceh, to prevent a 
looming humanitarian catastrophe. 
7. Press the Indonesian government to permit interna-
tional monitors, including UN Special Rapporteurs, to enter 
Aceh. 
8. Agree to the immediate suspension of the delivery of 
all military equipment to Indonesia and the imposition of a 
worldwide arms embargo on Indonesia. Above all, the need 
for international humanitarian intervention in Aceh is essen-
tial in order to deal with the looming economic crisis. 
Editors' note: We now know that while no decree banning 
CSOs has been issued, the clapdown has made it impossible 
for them to function. 
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Why the Acehnese want independence 
Raihan Diani was sentenced to six months last year for leading a demonstration in Banda Aceh to 
protest against the government's policy of militarisation and the promotion of violence. She came to 
Europe to attend the UN Human Rights Commission. 
8 
The following is an interview by TAPOL conducted just 
before the imposition of martial law in Aceh: 
Tapol: What was your personal experience during the DOM 
(Military Operations Zone -1989-1998) period? 
Raihan: I didn't personally suffer because my family was 
living in an urban area that wasn't badly hit. Many people 
had no idea what was going on but later when people started 
talking about the terrible things that had happened, it 
affected me greatly. At the time, people were afraid to speak 
out. Many aspects of life in Aceh were destroyed. Many 
people were hit hard physically, and the infrastructure was 
destroyed. This was while Suharto was still in 
power. 
On 7 August 1998, after Suharto was forced to 
stand down, General Wiranto announced the lifting 
of DOM and the situation became a bit easier. This 
was when people felt bold enough to speak out. We 
were hoping things would improve and people 
demanded that human rights violators should be 
brought to justice, but nothing happened. 
Tapol: When did you first become an activist? 
RD: It was in 1999 when I became active m 
Solidaritas Pe/ajar untuk Rakyat Aceh (Pupils in 
Solidarity with the Acehnese People). It had 
branches all over Aceh. 
Tapol: Was this an unusual thing for yourself, as a 
woman, to do? What's the attitude in Aceh towards 
women getting involved? 
Aceh, in Bireuen, also in East Aceh and Pidie. I have often 
visited these places and I've also visited South Aceh. 
Tapol: As I understand it, Acehnese were very enthusiastic 
when Indonesian independence was first proclaimed in 1945 
and collected valuables to purchase planes for the Republic. 
RD: Yes, that's true but things didn't get better for the 
Acehnese and its resources were exploited by Jakarta. Then 
there was a rebellion led by Daud Bereueh in the 1950s and 
Jakarta granted special rights in culture, religion and educa-
tion. But only one per cent of the proceeds of the exploita-
tion of our natural resources came back to the Acehnese. 
Yes, our people were enthusiastic at the time of Indonesian 
independence, but history has moved on since then. 
RD: It didn't stand on the way of our becoming active9L_.._....._____..; 
and taking on leadership positions. There are a lot of nai"ve Raihan Diani during a public rally in Banda Aceh celebrating 
people who think that women shouldn't get involved. This the International Women's Day, 8 March 2003 
kind of dogma was strongly promoted during the New 
Order, but there are many people who think it's against our 
culture. People need to think more positively about women. 
Tapol: When you first set up ORPAD, was there a lot of 
interest among women to join? 
RD: Yes, especially in conflict areas. The women were not 
willing to talk much about the situation, but after they 
joined ORPAD, they had the courage to speak out, to criti-
cise the situation. Their input became much greater. In areas 
of conflict, women are very vulnerable, always the ones to 
be hit by what is happening. 
After ORPAD was set up, I travelled a lot, especially to 
conflict areas. I have been able to combine this with contin-
uing my law studies at the faculty. I travel during the week-
ends when I don't have to attend lectures. I'm sure I will be 
able to keep this up. 
All this travelling helped me to become familiar with 
conditions in the areas of conflict. This is mainly in North 
When GAM emerged in 1976, Jakarta started to use 
military means against GAM. But this will never succeed 
and it has only increased people's desire for revenge and 
strengthened GAM. 
Acehnese have suffered greatly 
Tapol: How do Acehnese in general see Indonesia? 
RD: Because of the terrible things that happened during 
DOM, there are strong feelings of revenge. Many people 
feel there's no point being part of Indonesia because it has 
caused so much oppression. Many men and women were 
violated, many women lost their husbands or their children. 
Tapol: Who do people see as being responsible for this state 
of affairs? 
RD: Certainly the military, the long arm of Jakarta. To this 
day, Aceh is handled in a very militaristic way. Not long 
after DOM was lifted, more special operations were 
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launched by the military. 
The militaristic approach will never solve anything. The 
main problem is justice, dealing with all the violations. As 
well as that, the government should allow people to expres-
sion their opinions. They must do something to restore 
people's confidence. They shouldn't keep on sending more 
troops to Aceh. This only proves that they want all 
Acehnese to die. This is what experience has taught us. 
Tapol: Can you describe the women's movement in Aceh? 
RD: There are a number of women's organisation. There's 
Flower which works of empower women in the countryside. 
Another one is Relawan Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan 
(Women Volunteers for Humanitarian Action). Another is 
my own organisation, ORPAD, Organisasi Perempuan Aceh 
Demokratik (Democratic Acehnese Women's Organisation). 
We work together on many things, hoping to inspire other 
democratic organisations. We don't see men as the problem 
but we are trying to involve women in the movement. 
Tapol: But would you say women are more likely to join an 
organisation just composed of women? 
RD: Yes, that's true, which is why we have our own organ-
isations to involve women in the movement. In organisa-
tions controlled by men, women often feel that inferior or 
are reluctant to play an active part. It's often the case, in 
areas of conflict, that when we organise a forum for the 
whole community, women are reluctant to speak up. But in 
a women's organisation, they are better motivated to express 
their opinions. So we need to educate women to have the 
courage to speak out. But we also need to organise women 
together with men as we did in SPUR. 
Tapol: What led to your arrest last year? 
RD: ORPAD held a demonstration to protest against the 
Megawati government for not siding with the Acehnese 
people. They had created a Kodam (military command) in 
Aceh, and were waging military operations. Our demon-
stration was not very big but when we came out onto the 
street in Banda Aceh, the police were there and some of us 
were arrested. They were looking for the ones who were 
responsible and grabbed eight of us. 
We were taken to police headquarters in Aceh Besar. 
The police were very angry. During the demo, some police-
men approached me as I was holding the microphone and 
started hitting my hand with their rifle butts. They grabbed 
the mike and struck my hand. They were so angry with me, 
with the mike in my hand. My friends were frightened and 
I did what I could to calm them down. But the police were 
very unfriendly. 
Tapol: How did the police treat you? 
RD: I was questioned till late at night while my friends were 
put in a cell. I realised that the police were inserting things 
in the interrogation report that I hadn't said. For instance, 
they quoted me as saying that ORPAD has links with GAM. 
They had asked me about our links with GAM but I said 
there weren't any. When I saw this, I refused to sign the 
report .. They said I was inong balee (the women's wing of 
GAM). When I read that, I protested as I had never said that. 
It would have a terrible impact on me and the organisation. 
I refused to sign anything until they had deleted these 
ili~. . . . 
It was quite difficult for me because by this time, it was 
very late, two in the morning. Although I was very tired, I 
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had to read their report over and over again and tell them to 
delete things that weren't true. 
Tapol: What happened to your friends and what did they 
charge you with? 
RD: My friends were released the next day and told they 
would be called as witnesses in my trial. 
I was charged under Articles 134 and 13 7 of the 
Criminal Code, for blackening the name of the government. 
It was several months before the trial began. I made contact 
with Syarifah Murlina from LBH Banda Aceh and a lawyer 
from LBH Apik which focuses mainly on women. 
Nursyahbani from LBH Apik in Jakarta was also one of my 
lawyers. 
At police headquarters, it was very difficult because for 
much of the time I was the only woman there and all the 
police were men. Sometimes they would threaten me. Or, in 
the middle of the night, they would make a lot of noise so 
that I couldn't sleep, or start shouting at me. 
Later in prison, they treated the men like dirt. They 
would go to their cells at night and start beating or torturing 
them. If the men refused to confess, that was their right. 
They also sexually abused the men. For instance, they 
would tell them to strip naked and the police would watch 
them. I didn't see these things, but I knew what was going 
on. It was so horrible. Sometimes they would go into their 
cells very late at night. I remember one occasion, on 17 
August (Indonesia's national day). The police woke every-
one up in the middle of the night and ordered them to sing 
the national anthem. If they refused, they would be thrown 
into water. They did this to a group of men who were all 
GAM members and forced them to sing the national 
anthem. 
Transfer to prison 
After being with the police, I was transferred to prison, 
not a special prison for women but there were several cells 
for women. The other women weren't political prisoners. 
Things were now a bit better as I was allowed to have 
visits from friends and family, which wasn't permitted by 
the police. There were lots of intel (intelligence agents) at 
the police station who would always be asking me ques-
tions. I felt safer in prison. But I was interrogated a few 
times by police officers, because the document submitted 
by the police to the attorney, in preparation for my trial was 
not acceptable - not enough evidence and that kind of thing 
- and the police had to repeat some of the questioning. But 
I was also questioned by some civilian officials. 
But when I first arrived in the prison, some women 
warders gave me a thorough body search and I had to take 
off all my clothes. All we got to eat was a plate of rice and 
a piece of tempe or tahu. We never got any meat or fish. 
A couple of months after I was transferred to prison, I 
was joined by Lesley McCulloch. There was another 
woman who was an inong balee. She was put on trial but 
she didn't get a long sentence because she paid them a lot of 
money. 
My trial lasted for twelve sessions. I never confessed to 
anything. My lawyers submitted statements and I also wrote 
a defence plea in prison. Although I was given permission 
to do this, the officials kept watching me and got angry 
when they saw me writing. They seemed to think that only 
the lawyers should speak in court. 
When I was moved to the prison, the warders warned me 
not to try to influence the other prisoners. They kept threat-
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ening me. And when they saw me reading anything, they 
always wanted to know what I was reading. 
Independence is the solution 
Tapol: What do Acehnese people think about GAM? 
RD: They have a much higher regard for GAM now than 
in 1976. Many men want to join GAM because their 
wives have been killed or raped, or their parents have 
been maltreated. They want justice but that never 
happens. So they want to join GAM. 
Many Acehnese want independence from Indonesia. 
Our people suffered so many thousands of casualties 
during DOM but nothing has been done to rehabilitate 
people or to deal with the perpetrators, so people feel that 
the Indonesian government is not capable of making 
things better. That's why they think that independence is 
the best solution. In areas of conflict among the middle or 
lower classes, these feelings are very widespread which is 
quite understandable. It's the government's fault because it 
has does absolutely nothing to restore people's confidence 
in Indonesia. That's why so many people look to GAM 
and want independence. 
Tapol: So do you think they see GAM as the way out? 
RD: No, they don't see GAM as the way out, they see 
independence as the way out. Some people join GAM, but 
not all that many and they are mostly men. It's not GAM 
that's seen as the solution, but independence. 
The problem is the military 
Tapol: So how do you think independence can be won? 
RD: Not by using violence because this only causes more 
casualties. The best thing is for the people to unite in call-
ing for what they want. This could be done by a referen-
dum which is the democratic way. We need to have free-
dom of expression and we need to get rid of the military. 
As long as the military remain in Aceh, it's difficult for 
people to say what they think or want. The ten years of 
DOM traumatised the people. Seeing weapons in the 
hands of the military for so long has caused a lot of 
trauma. 
They remember the many massacres after DOM was 
lifted. As long as the military remain, people will be too 
continued from p 12 
afraid to think. The problem is the mili-
tary. If Indonesia wants to win back the 
confidence of the Acehnese, they wont 
do that by sending yet more military to 
Aceh. During DOM, many hundreds of 
women, more than six hundred, were 
raped. This is only the reported cases; 
there are certainly many more rapes 
than this. 
When DOM was lifted, our people 
demanded that the military should be 
withdrawn but that never happened. But 
what did happen was yet more opera-
tions like Operasi Wibawa. * 
members of the public. The TNI's vicious little war against 
the people of Aceh is daily reaching new heights and the 
chances of monitoring the situation are being strangulated by 
censorship and the gradual exclusion of foreign observers. 
Atrocities in Wamena 
In Papua, an incident in Wamena on 4 April when an army 
ammunition dump was raided by alleged members of the 
OPM has been used as the pretext to recall the army's elite 
corps, Kopassus, just recently ordered to leave the province. 
Since then, units of Kopassus and Kostrad, the army's fore-
most combat forces, are conducting continual operations 
ostensibly to find the missing weapons. Dozens of people 
have been arrested, one of whom died under torture while in 
police custody. Sweepings of villages irt the vicinity of 
Wamena have so terrified the inhabitants that thousands have 
fled into the forests, abandoning their gardens and living 
without proper shelter. Already there are reports of deaths due 
to lack of food and exposure to the cold night air. The military 
has meanwhile blocked attempts to c.onduct an investigation 
into an incident last August in the vicinity of the Freeport 
copper-and-gold mine when three teachers, one Indonesian 
and two Americans, were shot dead. Initial investigations by 
ELSHAM, Papua's leading human rights organisation, and 
the local police reached the conclusion that Kopassus 
members were probably responsible for the murders. Their 
purpose was to send a clear message to the mining company 
to continue to use their services to 'protect' the mine for 
which the company pays handsomely. ' 
. Both t.hese incidents have given the authorities the poten-
tial to pomt the finger of accusation at the OPM and more 
importantly, to provide justification for the TNI to bolster 
their presence in Papua on the grounds of fighting separatism. 
'Fig~t~ng s~parati~m' has the unstinting support of 
Ii;td?nesia s pohtical ehte, from the president down, who are 
g1vmg the armed forces carte blanche to conduct operations as 
they see fit. The policy poses a grave threat not only to the 
people of Aceh and Papua but also the Indonesian people as a 
whole who may one day wake up to find themselves in the 
grip of a new kind of military power, just as menacing as the 
military power under which they suffered for more than three 
decades during Suharto's New Order.* 
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Indonesia's territorial integrity and TNl's role in 
crushing separatism 
As the war in Aceh enters its second month and military operations in the Central Highlands in 
Papua intensify, it is timely to put these developments into a broader context and take a look at the 
well-documented plans of the Indonesian armed forces, the TNI, to reassert their role in political 
and security affairs, a move frequently referred to as their 'military comeback'. 
Since Megawati Sukamoputri took over as President in 
July 2001, replacing Abdurrahman Wahid who had tried to 
push for reform of the military - ultimately, the cause of his 
downfall - the Indonesian armed forces have succeeded in 
building a common front with the country's political elite, 
the president herself and the parties represented in parlia-
ment, the DPR. This common front centres around the 
determination to preserve Indonesia's territorial integrity, 
the so-called Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia or 
NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) . Not 
surprisingly, there is a deep sense of humiliation at the 'loss' 
of East Timar, felt particularly keenly by the TNI, and a 
determination not to 'lose' any more territory. 
The military doctrine: TN/ from the people and for the 
people 
The top echelon in the armed forces, the TNI comman-
der-in-chief General Endriartono Sutarto, and the army's 
chief-of staff, General Ryacudu Ryamizard, have frequently 
insisted that the NKRI project can only be secured by 
giving the military a greater, and indeed the decisive, role in 
fighting separatism, the 'scourge' which threatens the 
Indonesian state in the two resource-rich provinces, Aceh 
and Papua. By virtue of two decrees and two laws adopted 
in 2000, their role has been seriously undermined. These 
provide for the separation of the police force, Polri, from 
the TNI, and establishes the role of the police in the preser-
vation of security and order, restricting the TNI to being 
responsible for the defence of the realm against foreign 
foes. 
The first important sign of a determination to reverse the 
reform process came with a meeting of hundreds of active 
and retired top-ranking military officers convened by 
Ryacudu Ryamizard in February this year. Following the 
meeting Ryacudu said that 'the military's security role 
should be reinstated due to the threats of separatism and 
other security disturbances'. Fine-tuning the army's profes-
sionalism might be enough for the armed forces of a coun-
try like the US, he said, but for Indonesia whose process of 
nation-building had not been completed, this was not 
enough. 'The army,' he said, 'was very concerned with the 
country's territorial integrity.' [The Jakarta Post, 21 March 
2003] 
The White Paper 
This was soon followed by the publication of a Defence 
White Paper, by the minister of defence, Matori Abdul 
Djalil, a civilian who is quite comfortable with being the 
mouthpiece of the country's most heavily militarised depart-
ment of state. This White Paper argues that while Indonesia 
does not face any immediate threat of a foreign invasion, 
the so-called 'traditional' threat facing a purely defence 
force, it faces numerous 'non-traditional' threats ranging 
from terrorism, communal conflicts, illegal logging and 
trafficking in people to separatism. It argues further that as 
long as such threats remain at a 'low-intensity level', they 
can be handled by the police but the more serious they 
become, the more incumbent it is on the TNI to handle 
them. 
The White Paper argues throughout that it is the task of 
the TNI to 'safeguard the nation', which requires that it 
prepare not only for 'war military operations' but also 'non-
war military operations' called 'operasi military selain 
perang', a serious encroachment on the role of the police. 
The Jakarta Post described this as 'tantamount to a vote of 
no ·confidence in our police and probably even amounts to 
an insult'. [15 April 2003] 
The White Paper also argues for a reversal of a much-
mooted major reform project for the TNI, the dismantling of 
the territorial command system. Instead of dismantling the 
system, it will be retained. Indeed, in the recent past, two 
new territorial command structures have been established 
' in Maluku and Aceh, while others are likely to be estab-
lished when Papua is split up into three provinces, a project 
close to the heart of the TNI. 
Army from and for the people 
Using the argument that underpinned the role of the armed 
forces during the Suharto New Order era, that the army is 
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'the army of the people and must remain close to the people', 
the White Paper says that any attempt to distance the army 
from the people is an 'abuse of the very essence' (kodrat) of 
the army. 
Being 'part of the people' can only be achieved by the 
retention of its 'territorial command function' , or to use a 
term now so popular, the 'embedding' of the army among 
the people. The territorial command structure ensures the 
army a presence at every administrative level of society, 
from provincial down to district, sub-district and village 
levels. As some commentators have pointed out, this will 
ensure that the army remains the most powerful and best-
organised political institution in the country, whatever the 
outcome of the general elections due to be held in 2004. 
Aceh and West Papua 
The Defence White Paper also emphasises the role of the 
TNI in facing 'the threat of armed separatism in Aceh and 
Papua' . It laments the fact that these armed struggles have 
intensified during the past decade and have 'even won 
sympathy and support for their causes in other countries' . In 
the case of Aceh, while welcoming the 'cessation of hostili-
ties accord' (COHA) signed in December 2002, it states 
unequivocally that the Indonesian government will pursue 
that accord by 'persuading GAM to return to the fold of the 
motherland and accepting the framework of NKRI'. This 
was one of the demands that led to the final breakdown of 
talks between Indonesia and GAM in Tokyo in the weekend 
of 17-18 May, leading to the declaration of Martial Law in 
Aceh on 19 May. 
With regard to Papua, the White Paper states that the sepa-
ratist OPM group is still active, and is using 'propaganda, 
incitements, terror, robberies and pressurising the popula-
tion', resulting in widespread unrest and fear. The OPM 
and their supporters 'have set up networks abroad to seek 
international support'. It goes on to say that 'as things stand 
at present, NKRI has the strong support of the international 
community which regards Papua as an internal matter for 
Indonesia'. While stating that it is the task of the TNI to 
'overwhelm' the. OPM separatists so as to preserve NKRI, 
this will be pursued in the first place 'by persuading the 
separatists to re-unite with their brothers in NKRI'. But 
should the response to this approach not be positive, 'the 
government wiJI consider using more effective methods'. 
Combating separatism 
Combating separatism is clearly at the top of the TNI's 
agenda as it rolls back the process of reform. 
While commentators were still absorbing the contents of 
the Defence White Paper and working out their responses, 
along came yet another move, the publication of a draft bill 
on the TNI. Without waiting for any discussion in parlia-
ment, the chairmen of the two national legislative cham-
bers, Akbar Tanjung (recently sentenced to three years 
imprisonment in a fraud case) who is still functioning as 
chairman of Parliament, the DPR, and Amien Rais, chair-
man of the People's Congress, the MPR, announced their 
endorsement of the bill. 
The draft has provoked a storm of protest focused in 
particular on Article 19 which grants the power to the TNI 
commander to mobilise his forces in a situation which he 
perceives to be an emergency, without consulting the head 
of state. Some commentators describe this as the loophole 
for a 'legal coup'. A carefully considered evaluation has 
come from the Coalition for Democracy which regards this 
as 'a systematic endeavour to reject political authority by 
strengthening the authority of the army commander, and 
removing civilian control over the armed forces'. Some of 
the country's foremost experts on the military, including 
Munir, Todung Mulya Lubis, Kustanto Anggoro, Ikrar Nusa 
Bakti and Syamsuddin Haris have joined in voicing these 
concerns. [Sinar Harapan, 4 March 2003]. 
By granting to the TNI commander the authority to estab-
lish defence policy and deploy national resources in promo-
tion of that policy, the authority of the minister of defence 
has been overridden and the principle of civilian control 
over the armed forces has been removed. 
TN! propaganda through the press 
According to Syamsuddin Haris, the draft bill grants 
unlimited powers to the TNI commander to make his own 
'subjective definition that the sovereignty of the state, the 
country's territorial integrity and the security of the national 
are under threat'. Moreover, Article 19 speaks about the need 
to act to 'prevent greater damage being inflicted on the state'. 
The elucidation that accompanies the Bill defines this as 
meaning 'mass unrest and other things'. The vague, open-
ended definition can, as Syamsuddin warns, be easily used 
by the army to pursue its own political agenda. 
It remains to be seen how the draft will be handled by the 
DPR, but the omens are not good, as the parties represented 
in parliament are falling over themselves to affirm their 
loyalty to and support for the armed forces. This may be 
even truer following the start of the war in Aceh. No party in 
parliament has voiced concern about, let alone opposition to, 
the president's decision to declare martial law or to the brutal 
activities of the armed forces in pursuit of their war aims. 
The Indonesian armed forces are now engaged in two 
major military operations, in Aceh and Papua. In Aceh, civil 
society which includes a whole range of non-governmental 
organisations dealing with human rights, the monitoring of 
atrocities and the humanitarian needs of the many thousands 
of internally displaced people, are being forced to curb their 
activities and activists are fleeing the province in fear of 
their lives. The international aid agencies are unable to go 
anywhere outside Banda Aceh, while Indonesian journalists 
are under strict orders to clear all their reports about the war 
with the military authorities before publication. Allegations 
in the Indonesian press that all the people killed so far are 
GAM members or sympathisers have been challenged by 
activists who we have been able to contact inside the 
province. They say that, as in every previous phase of mili-
tary brutality in Aceh, the majority of victims are ordinary 
continued on p 10 
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A soft coup by the military 
Martial law and the massive military operation in Aceh launched in May is confirmation that the 
military is determining the political agenda in Jakarta. For a short period following the fall of 
Suharto in 1998, it seemed that the military were willing to accept civilian supremacy but recent 
developments prove that this was an illusion. 
The declaration of martial law in Aceh and the massive 
military operation involving about 50,000 troops - only to be 
compared with the invasion of East Timor in December 1975 
-also signals the symbolic death of reformasi, the name of the 
reform movement that emerged after the fall of Suharto in 
1998. Yet again it is the TNI, the Indonesian armed forces, 
and in particular the army, who are deciding the political 
agenda and halting the process of civilian supremacy over 
the military or still worse, has reversed the process. 
Political events in the first months of 2003 brought the 
role of the military to the fore again. On 21 February, 250 
active and retired army generals came together to show 
their determination to play an active role again in politics 
and to voice their grievances about the feeble policies of the 
Megawati government. The publication of a White Paper 
by the Defence Ministry, run by retired generals, is further 
proof of their dogged determination to keep control of polit-
ical events. The weak, ineffective government and a weak-
kneed parliament, incapable of resolving serious economic 
and political problems, has shifted public opinion in favour 
of the TNI as the only solid, centralised body capable of 
holding the country together. (1) 
All this has focussed on the threat of 'separatism' and the 
determination of the TNI to hold the country together. 
'Fighting separatism' has become the main rationale for the 
TNI to step back onto the political arena. 
Discussions in the DPR, the Indonesian parliament, on 
draft bills on the TNI and on state intelligence, and the 
enactment of the anti-terrorist regulation into law have 
provoked controversy, particularly among Indonesian 
NGOs and military watchers. The main focus was on 
Article 19 of the TNI bill which was nicknamed the 'coup 
d'etat article', because it would grant extraordinary powers 
to the TNI to declare a state of emergency without consult-
ing the president. General Endriartono Sutarto, commander-
in-chief of the TNI argued that, when the country is in 
turmoil and the president is unavailable or maybe 
kidnapped by rebels, do we have to wait till a new president 
is installed ? (2) 
People these days tend to talk about the 'good old days' 
of the Suharto era, when the economy was running well and 
regions of conflict like Aceh, West Papua and Maluku were 
under the grip of the Suharto regime. 
Key issues regarding the military . 
Serious Indonesia watchers have always closely scruti-
nised the role of the military. It remains the main parameter 
for analysing Indonesian politics. While the New Order 
period was characterised by General Suharto's strong grip 
over the TNI, the three presidents since 1998 must be 
judged by their relationship with the TNI top and in partic-
ular with the army top. 
Parade of Kopassus troops, the army elite unit with the 
worst track record on human rights violations. In the 
middle Chief of Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu, a noto-
rious hardliner 
The excessive role performed by the military during the 
New Order period from 1965 till 1998 fits the description of 
an authoritarian regime par excellence. The complexities of 
Indonesia, the largest archipelago in the world, a diverse 
mix of ethnic groups and religions, were steam-rolled into a 
republic of fear under a formidable network of military 
intelligence and a territorial army with a presence from the 
capital down to the villages. In addition, General Suharto 
held power by bribing vast swathes of society into alle-
giance or acquiescence through the proceeds from gas, oil 
and other mineral revenues. The military ideology became 
synonymous with an obsession with national unity. 
In the eighties, Suharto tried to create one unifying ideol-
ogy, steam rolling and homogenising the huge variety of 
cultures and ethnicities. Totalitarian systems always create 
their own antithesis and the homogenised doctrine called 
Pancasila totally collapsed. The antithesis was also 
predictable: the fall of Suharto was followed by an outburst 
of regional demands for more freedom, justice and auton-
omy. All this ended in more deepening ethnic, religious and 
cultural divides. 
From the first days of the Indonesian republic, regional 
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rebellions were a constant threat to unity. During the New 
Order, rebellions were handled according to a single recipe: 
brutal repression through military operations. This could 
only happen under the rigid control of a military security 
body, initially set up in 1965 to combat communism but 
used subsequently to keep a stranglehold over civil society. 
This security approach remains the main feature of the 
Indonesian military strategy. 
Another feature of authoritarian regimes is engaging 
The fear of a military coup d'etat (kudeta in Bahasa) 
Sinar Harapan, 4 March 2003 
itself in military adventures. In 1975 Suharto and some key 
generals decided to grab East Timor. Running an occupied 
country turned out to be very different from oppressing its 
own population. As recent global history tells us, a military 
victory is only a small part of the story, winning the hearts 
and minds of the East Timorese was a much more difficult 
hurdle to jump. In the end, the TNI and its proxies, the mili-
tia units went on the rampage when the East Timorese voted 
for independence. 
Military might by US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq are . 
the latest examples of the easier part of achieving a rela-
tively smooth military victory while facing the more diffi-
cult task of building the nation from scratch. 
The withdrawal of TN I from East Timor in September 1999 
was a humiliation for the military top as UN Peacekeeping 
Forces stepped in. Hardliners within the TNI still cling to the 
belief that Indonesia is the rightful owner of East Timor. The 
East Timor drama has only strengthened the belief of TNI 
that it was an international conspiracy that led to the defeat 
in East Timor and as a result, TNI officers in general deeply 
distrust foreign powers and foreign intervention. 
The military operation in Aceh launched in May 2003 is 
another blatant example of a military adventure where the 
military top from the outset rejected the peace process and 
saw negotiations as an act of humiliation for Indonesia vis-
a-vis separatist rebels. On top of this, the involvement of the 
Geneva-based NGO, the Humanitarian Dialogue Centre 
(HDC), originally called the Henry Dunant Centre, that 
facilitated the talks between Jakarta and GAM was seen by 
the military as being foreign intervention in domestic affairs. 
Last but not least, the post-Suharto period is regarded as a 
very painful period for most high-ranking officers. The TNI 
have had to forego much of its political clout and the refor-
masi era forced the military to leave formal politics. For 
more than 30 years TNI was used to being centre stage in 
running state affairs. A comeback by TNI was bound to 
happen, especially in a period of a dysfunctional govern-
ment and feeble political institutions in present day 
Indonesia. 
A soft coup by the military 
The crucial question is whether the military will take over 
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state affairs; this can be answered in 
the negative. In the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Suharto regime the 
military organised a number of internal 
meetings to assess the new situation. 
Their public image was a shambles. Up 
to its topmost levels, the TNI was 
responsible for massacres and for the 
killing and kidnapping of activists; the 
destruction of East Timar in September 
was the last straw. TNI became an 
international pariah. Moreover, the 
thriving reformasi movement at its 
peak demanded that the TNI should 
retreat from the political arena and also 
demanded the dismantling of the terri-
torial structure of the army. 
The army top was very disunited in 
assessing the new situation and the 
several fractions were almost fighting 
it out in the streets. But the majority of officers agreed on 
certain major issues. The military should not be involved in 
politics as in the New Order period. In its extreme form in 
the seventies and eighties, most of the important jobs in the 
civilian structure were occupied by military, either retired or 
still on active service. The other structure called sospo1 
(sosial politik), was a typical structure of the New Order 
period in which the military were entitled to control the 
political activities of civilians. As many officers said, the 
TNI was in need of its own 'reformasi intern'. The conclu-
sion of the army top was to withdraw from too much 
involvement in politics. Some points were obvious: the 
army would not be involved in day-to-day politics and 
would gradually withdraw from the legislative bodies and 
would no longer be linked to any political grouping or party. 
(3) 
The other common understanding reached in the refor-
masi intern discussion was the way Suharto and his cronies 
(which included many TNI officers) had led the country in 
the wrong direction. Corruption and nepotism became the 
hallmark which resulted in a weak and flabby TNI. ( 4) 
By itself, this was an important conclusion as it meant 
distancing itself from a claque of super-rich generals who 
were part of the Suharto inner circle. A period of rethinking 
and consolidation was needed. The army was willing to take 
a few steps back from the political arena and reassess its 
new role in society. 
The Turkish model 
Conditions in the post-Suharto period are profoundly 
different from October 1965 when Suharto and the army 
conducted a successful coup. Many people didn't realise 
that a coup was being implemented as Suharto removed his 
predecessor Sukarno step by step. (5) 
In that period, the TNI faced a formidable force, the 
Indonesian Communist Party, PKI, at the height of the cold 
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war in Southeast Asia. Suharto and the army enjoyed all the 
favours and support imaginable from the west. 
The conditions in 1998 were very different. Suharto was 
an outdated dictator and of no further use to the west in the 
post-cold war world. The brutalities perpetrated by the TNI 
in East Timor, Aceh and other places were at the centre of 
the international human rights agenda, ruining Suharto's 
and the TNI's image. Equally, there was a deep sense of 
loathing domestically for Suharto and the TNI. Five years 
on, even with a strutting, self-confident army leadership and 
a dysfunctional civilian government, a military-run govern-
ment still remains a remote possibility. (6) 
The only feasible option left is to find a side door to enter 
politics again. The TNI has begun to recreate its image as a 
people's army and guardian of state unity. The TNI only step 
in when they think it is necessary, i.e. whenever govern-
ment policies are seen as threatening national unity. This 
model has become a tradition in Turkey for the last 40 
years; the term 'Turkish model' is used by political analysts 
for an active watchdog role for the military. The military in 
Turkey carried out four coups in four decades and in 
Military operation in Aceh is a domestic affair 
between, implemented several soft coups. A soft coup is 
defined as intervention in the political process without over-
throwing the government. The last soft coup in Turkey 
happened in 1997 when the duly elected Prime Minister 
Erbakan was forced to resign when he was seen as a threat 
to secular order in Turkey. 
The announcement of martial law by the Indonesian 
government on 19 May fits the category of soft coups as the 
Indonesian government was actually pursuing a different line 
through negotiations with GAM, the Free Aceh Movement. 
The reversal was definitely as a result of the actions of the 
military. This soft coup by the TNI is almost imperceptible 
and has been hardly noticeable to the general public, being 
backed by the majority of members of parliament and 
members of the cabinet, including President Megawati. 
It could be argued that the impeachment of President 
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Wahid (Gus Dur) in July 2001 was the first soft coup by the 
TNI in post-Suharto Indonesia. Gus Dur's presidency was 
characterised by a never-ending conflict with the military; 
for a number of reasons he became increasingly isolated 
politically while the military consolidated their position. In 
an act of desperation Gus Dur tried to impose martial law by 
means of a presidential decree but the TNI and the Police 
refused to cooperate, defiantly refusing to disband parlia-
ment. A few days later Gus Dur was impeached by the MPR, 
the People's Congress. The departure of Gus Dur also meant 
the departure of the few liberal generals who had accepted 
the paradigm of civilian supremacy but who had never been 
more that a tiny minority in the TNI rank and file. 
Fostering and grooming conflicts 
The TNI image was heavily bruised by the reformasi 
movement in 1998, but it was able to make a relatively swift 
comeback, not least because of the continuous malfunction-
ing of the newly-created democratic institutions like politi-
cal parties and the executive, legislative and judiciary 
bodies. Several global issues, not the least the 11 September 
tragedy, helped the TNI to speed up its consolidation. The 
global war against terrorism, Washington's response to 11 
September, enhanced the role of the military or more 
precisely the role of military intelligence. (7) 
But even more important are a series of domestic events, 
used or groomed by sections of the army to show their 
indispensability in keeping the country together. A 
sustained campaign of destabilisation was organised by 
hardliners in the army, not least by sections ofKopassus, the 
notorious elite squad of the army. (8) 
This 'strategy of tension' (the term widely used in Italy in 
the sixties and seventies when many terrorist activities took 
place) was applied in its most successful form in places like 
Maluku and Poso (Central Sulawesi) where extreme wings 
of Christian militia were pitched against extremists from 
the Muslim camp. The military intelligence scenario 
succeeded in fanning the conflict; civil society in both areas 
collapsed and the religious conflict grew unchecked. The 
conflicts in Maluku and Poso were groomed and fostered by 
key military hardliners. The violence died down when the 
TNI top stepped in and dislodged the most extreme militia 
groups from the region. Things calmed down and the mili-
tary emerged as the saviour, while rewarding itself with a 
new territorial command in North Maluku. 
Growing demands for independence in West Papua and 
Aceh have also been utilised by the military to justify their 
presence and military operations there. Every time peaceful 
means or negotiations materialise, conflicts flare up and 
military operations become the rationale. 
TNI on the offensive 
In a packed meeting of 250 active and retired generals on 
20 February, the army chief-of-staff General Ryamizard 
Ryacudu made a solemn pledge: 'The Indonesian army will 
never tolerate efforts to separate Papua and Aceh from 
NKRI [the Unitary State of Indonesia], whether they come 
from at home or abroad'. The same general who cannot 
open his mouth without spewing out tough language, said 
on another occasion that GAM and OPM (Free Papua 
Movement) are rebels and enemies of the state and should 
be eradicated. 
The aim of all those remarks was clearly directed at 
achieving the goal of being solely responsible for handling 
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domestic security. In 1999, Polri, the police force, was sepa-
rated from the military and was given the task of dealing 
with law and order but the TNI never accepted this. 
A new batch of officers has emerged, brimming with self-
confidence and surveying contemptuously the woeful 
performance of civilian politicians. A new, mutual symbio-
sis is emerging. On the one hand the military have gained 
confidence and become entrenched in the old military 
doctrines. The basics of the military doctrine are quite 
simple. They are the ones who fought and achieved inde-
pendence while civilian politicians were engaged in feeble 
diplomatic work. The other main doctrine holds that the 
military originate from the common people and it is more 
than justifiable for the TNI to involve itself in politics, that 
only the military can safeguard the nation from separatism, 
turmoil, rising criminality and so on. 
On the other hand, civilians who run the government and 
sit in parliament yearn for military guidance as the only 
option. It creates weird situations where provincial legisla-
tors and political parties back retired officers as sole candi-
dates for the post of governor in all the provinces. The mili-
tary are back in the front seat but this time with the full 
support of the political community. 
The White Paper 
The Defence White Paper is another example of the new 
arrogance by the military. Formally published by the 
Defence Department, headed by a civilian minister, it was 
written by retired officers, including Lt-General Sudradjat, 
the influential secretary-general of the department. The 
White Paper was presented as the key document for 
explaining how the military are facing the challenges in the 
21st century. The result is shoddy, an example of a dead end 
in Indonesian military thinking. 
Poorly written with no new ideas emerging, the White 
Paper's principal aim is to justify the TNl's territorial func-
tion and its role in dealing with separatism, terrorism, 
piracy, illegal logging and trafficking of people. 
The most worrying part of the book is the blatant admis-
sion that in the foreseeable future, Indonesia need not worry 
about external enemies. The main threats are domestic and 
although in the post-Suharto structure most of these tasks 
are the responsibility of the police, the military has 
denounced this. The White Paper explicitly argues that Polri 
aren't capable of handling domestic security issues. 
The civilian-military relationship 
The Megawati government is entering its third year, quite 
an achievement if one considers that her predecessors, 
Habibie and Wahid, lasted less than two years. One of the 
major features of her reign is one of accommodation with 
the military. Wahid's presidency ended in impeachment not 
least because of his troubled relationship with the top of the 
military. Megawati's relationship with the top of the mili-
tary is based more on realpolitik and a common approach 
than Wahid's. 
The appointment of General Endriartono Sutarto, a main-
stream reform officer, as TNI commander-in-chief calmed 
the turbulent atmosphere of the Wahid period. She only 
appointed four retired army generals in the cabinet, but each 
of them has been given a heavyweight position. 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is the Coordinating Minister 
for Security and Political Affairs, known usually as SBY. He 
functions more or less as Indonesia's prime minister and has 
been crucial in the negotiations on Aceh under the auspices of 
the Henry Dunant Centre in Geneva. Indonesia's presidential 
system makes Megawati's powers simil~r to those ?f the ~S 
president but her inexperience and seemmg lack of mterest m 
political matters makes the posi~ion of SBY. even more 
pivotal. Hari Sabarno, another retired general, is the home 
affairs minister, a position of exceptional importance also due 
to the territorial structure of the military that shadows the 
administrative structure from provincial capitals to the 
villages. 
The two other generals in the cabinet belong to 
Megawati's inner core and have a strong influence on 
Megawati's policy-making. Retired Lt-General Hendro-
priyono who is the chief of the intelligence agency BIN is 
also a member of the cabinet. BIN is the revamped intelli-
gence body and in future will function along the lines of the 
National Security Council in the White House. 
As intelligence supremo, Hendropriyono carries a lot of 
political weight, combined with his background as a long-
serving Kopassus intelligence officer. His past record as a 
ruthless commander has left many bloody trails in different 
parts of the republic, not least in Lampung where he led a 
raid in 1989 that resulted in a bloodbath of innocent 
villagers. The present minister of communications, retired 
Lt-General Agum Gumelar has a similar background. He 
also served as Kopassus officer and at the height of his mili-
tary career became director ofBAIS, the influential military 
intelligence body. Both ministers have been instrumental in 
the decision to launch the military operation in Aceh. The 
preparation of this operation and its aims carry all the hall-
marks of an intelligence and counter insurgency operation. 
Ever since the birth of the Indonesian Republic in 1945, 
the military have always played a major role in politics. 
Only for a brief period in the first half of the fifties were the 
military subordinate to the civilian government. In the New 
Order era of Suharto which lasted more than three decades, 
the country was run along the lines of a totalitarian military 
regime. 
The fall of General Suharto in May 1998 eroded the domi-
nant role ofTNI and in the brief periods of the Habibie and 
Wahid presidential terms, there were some achievements in 
democratic control of the military. Parliament nowadays 
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can exert more control on the TNI and demand more trans-
parency. The Defence Department has been reorganised and 
is nominally run by civilians. The Defence Law and the 
Law on the Police provides enough judicial control. 
But the reality is different. Martial law in Aceh has proven 
that democratic control over the military is feeble and inef-
fective . The military top simply consulted with the heads of 
the fractions in parliament and the green light was given. It 
is still the military who determine the political agenda in 
Indonesia. 
Political analysts consistently describe the Indonesian 
military as 'a state within the state' or 'a closed corporate 
group'. Some analysts go further and consider the_ position 
of the military at present to be much stronger than in the 
closing years of the Suharto era. (9) 
When push comes to shove, political will is needed to curb 
the powers of the military. It means strengthening the polit-
ical institutions and ensuring that civilians assert control 
over the military. This applies also to the military. Without 
the willingness of military officers to accept democratic 
reforms, the road to democracy will stagnate, as is now the 
case. Or still worse, choosing the militaristic road, the 
future of Indonesia looks utterly bleak and paraodoxically, 
continued from p 28 
nies. [Jakarta Post, 20 May 2003] That is clearly going to take 
months, if not years, to achieve. 
Labour law provokes controversy 
A new labour law adopted in February this year has aroused 
protest among many, though not all, trade unions. During the 
Suharto era, the workers were tightly controlled, with only one 
state-sponsored union being allowed. Towards the end of the 
New Order, several other unions announced their existence. 
In 2000, when the spirit of reformasi was still strong, a 
ministerial regulation was introduced which swung decisively 
in the workers' favour, and according to some commentators, 
had the effect of stifling investment and prompting new 
companies to hire temporary workers to circumvent the 
requirements of companies to grant rights to their employees. 
The 2003 law which replaces the 2000 regulation has been 
dubbed a 'law to woo investment' It has been widely 
welcomed by employers' organisations, and also by some 
unions that are a continuation of unions that existed during the 
New Order. Employers' organisations want implementation to 
commence without delay, saying that 'many investors have 
pulled out of Indonesia, while others have declined to invest 
because of what they describe as an unfavourable business 
climate'. 
One of the most contentious issues is the formation of 
labour courts to arbitrate on industrial strikes, which will be 
placed under the jurisdiction of district courts. One highly 
contentious issue, according to Mochtar Pakpahan of the SBSI, 
is the provision that both lawyers and judges representing the 
workers should be university graduates. The union wants the 
courts to be recruited from labour activists. 
The law deals with the contentious issue of out-sourcing 
jobs which is widely used by companies to avoid being bound 
by working conditions and pay laid down in agreements with 
unions representing their employees. The new law bans out-
sourcing of services that are part of the permanent production 
process or core business. This would appear to open the way 
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the break up of Indonesia becomes more likely. 
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for loose interpretation. The law also states that temporary 
workers cannot be hired for jobs that are an integrated part 
of the production process, although temporary jobs are 
allowed under certain circumstances for a maximum period 
of three years. 
Strikes must be notified to the employers and the rele-
vant authorities, otherwise they will be illegal and striking 
workers could be barred from entering their company's 
premises. The law also establishes the principle of 'no-
work-no-pay' which union leaders have described as intol-
erable considering that workers are striking to demand 
higher pay or better working conditions and should not be 
penalised for going on strike. 
The majority of trade union federations have come out 
strongly against the law. Soon after its enactment, a coali-
tion of 22 unions announced plans to oppose the law and 
call for its repeal. The SBSI, one of the first independent 
unions to be set up during the Suharto era, is not in favour 
of the law and has criticised parliament, the DPR, for fail-
ing to conduct proper consultations with the unions. 
Dita Indah Sari, chair of the FNPBI, condemned the law 
for reducing workers' rights and for allowing the employ-
ment of children in contravention of regulations banning 
children from working. Compensation for workers who 
resign voluntarily or who are dismissed for misdemeanours 
were far lower that under the previous law. 
Severance pay not paid by companies 
that fold 
In the recent period when a number of foreign finns 
have withdrawn from Indonesia, workers who have lost 
their jobs at such companies have been badly hit by compa-
nies closing their factories and fleeing the country before 
paying their workers salaries and severance pay. 
In 2002, workers at eight garment factories lost their 
jobs when the companies closed their factories and shifted 
their production activities abroad. They had not been paid 
wages or given severance pay to which they were entitled. 
continued on p 23 
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Military operations in the Central Highlands 
Following an attack on the ammunition dump of the Wamena military command during which 29 M-
16s and a large quantity of ammunition were seized, there has been a sustained crackdown in the 
surrounding area. Thousands of people have fled their homes and are without food and proper shel-
ter. Eighteen people have died since the crackdown began, most of them shot or tortured. 
The raid on the arsenal of the military command in 
Wamena occurred early on 4 April. Two soldiers and a local 
person, allegedly one of the perpetrators of the raid, were 
killed. A number of soldiers of the Wamena command have 
been arrested for alleged negligence in the performance of 
their guarding duties, 
Although the Indonesian armed forces, TNI, accused 
separatists of the attack, it is strongly suspected that the TNI 
themselves were behind it to create an incident that would 
justify a crackdown. The military immediately launched an 
operation to recover the stolen weapons, casting their net 
across a swathe of villages in the subdistrict of Kuyawage 
and lliem, in the Baliem Valley. 
Kopassus troops re-engaged 
The immediate response was to recall Kopassus troops 
to the area to conduct military reprisals against the popula-
tion. A few weeks earlier, all Kopassus troops had been 
withdrawn from Papua. Whether intentionally or not, the 
Wamena incident paved the way for the army's most notori-
ous force to re-engage in operations against the 'scourge' of 
separatism. 
Immediately following the attack, the military arbitrarily 
arrested and detained up to thirty Papuans. Many were 
beaten and tortured. One of the detainees, Yapenas Murib, 
was killed whilst in the hands of Kopassus troops. He was 
dragged out of his cell, already in a weak physical state 
because of maltreatment, and taken out to the street. A metal 
noose was tied round his neck and attached to the back of a 
truck. When he was ordered to walk, the truck pulled him in 
the opposite direction causing him to fall. He was then 
dragged along the ground. During this prolonged act of 
torture, he covered a distance of 3 kms. He died later that 
day, after choking on his food. 
Within days of the attack 186 army personnel, from 
Kopassus and from the army's strategic command, Kostrad, 
were deployed to the region. They began a mass sweeping 
operation through highland villages, arbitrarily attacking 
and killing civilians and destroying homes and crops. 
Soldiers arbitrarily shot people on sight. Many homes were 
burnt, as well as three schools and a health clinic. 
Plantations and crops were confiscated along with farming 
equipment. Many people were arbitrarily beaten and ques-
tioned in relation to the attack on the military command in 
Wamena. 
During these operations, the army used pro-Jakarta mili-
tia known as Satgas Merah Putih consisting of local people 
recruited and trained in the past year by the military. As a 
result of these operations, thousands of people, mostly from 
Kuyawage, were forced to flee their homes and are now 
hiding in the forests. 
A graphic account of sweepings by the military while 
searching for the missing weapons is contained in a report 
issued on 6 May by an investigation team set up by the 
NGO Coalition for the Protection and Enforcement of 
Human Rights in Papua. The report is based on the testi-
monies of dozens of witnesses. 
The sweepings took place in villages where the armed 
wing of the OPM, known as the TPN/OPM, are known to 
have local posts, the aim being to incriminate them while at 
the same time striking fear and trauma among the popula-
tion. A number of homes or honai were burnt down in 
Napua village, district ofHubi Kossi, including the home of 
Yapenas Murib, who was later tortured to death. The oper-
ation was conducted by a substantial number of troops, 
though the precise number could not be ascertained. The 
inhabitants fled to other homes for sanctuary. 
One witness, Emius Gwijangge told the tel;lm: 'The 
troops came at night, they gathered the inhabitants together 
and asked them to indicate the whereabouts ofYapenas, but 
we said we knew nothing. The soldiers used their jackboots 
to kick me in both ears. After that they search our homes 
then set them on fire.' 
Army operations in Wouma kampung, Wamena, were 
directed against Soleman Heregam, who has been a member 
of the local TPN/OPM group for several years. Soleman 
Heregem who was arrested and tortured by soldiers and 
militias, later told members of the team: 'We knew 
absolutely nothing about the weapons which were stolen. 
We were hunted down only because of our struggle (for an 
independent Papua).' The team also established that 
TPN/OPM posts are to be found throughout the Baliem 
Valley. They do not possess weapons but say that their aim 
is to popularise their struggle. 
While Soleman was being arrested, his wife, Paulina 
Lantipo was molested by militias and her string bag (noken) 
was pulled from her neck. When she ran to recover her bag, 
she was held by the neck until she could hardly breath. In 
the scuffle, her blouse was torn off and she was left naked 
to the waist; her tormentors threatened to kill her for 
protecting her husband. When her bag was later returned, all 
the contents had been removed including important docu-
ments and money. 
Current situation 
Many of the villages remain under military control and 
occupation. The villagers are still in the forests, too scared 
to return to their homes. They have no access to food, are 
exposed to extreme conditions and are experiencing wide-
spread starvation. They are unable to return to their crops, 
as those that are not destroyed are guarded by military offi-
cers who shoot people on sight. 
In a statement to the press, Kontras-Papua, the 
Commission for the Disappeared and the Victims of 
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Violence, issued on 6 June, said that at least sixteen people 
have died as a result of these operations. Most died after 
being shot, tortured or beaten by the troops, while two died 
from lack of food. Kontras said that there was strong 
evidence that the military committed crimes against human-
ity. According to Kontras, more than 5,000 villagers, mostly 
residents of Kuyawage and Ilehe, have taken refuge in the 
forest. 
The military has closed off the area and are refusing 
access to church groups, humanitarian aid and human rights 
workers. 
In a statement at the end of May, the Student 
Communication Forum of the Central Highlands called 
attention to the shooting dead of Kabelek Hiluka. It strongly 
refuted the allegation by the army that he was shot while 
trying to escape. The victim was not even a member of the 
TPN/OPM but had returned to his home village, Jiwika in 
Kuurulu district, to settle a debt. The Forum called for the 
immediate withdrawal of army and police forces from the 
Wamena area where they are wreaking such havoc among 
the civilian population. A humanitarian team should be 
dispatched to the area to provide food and medicines to the 
villagers now taking refuge in the forest. It also called on the 
National Human Rights Commission to set up a special 
investigation team, a KPP-HAM, to investigate the Wamena 
incident with a mandate to examine the background and 
motive of the event and identify the perpetrators. 
ELSHAM leaders to be charged by army 
The Trikora military command in Jayapura has 
announced their intention to file a lawsuit against Papua's 
leading human rights organisation, ELSHAM, for defama-
tion. The military allege that ELSHAM besmirched the good 
name of the army when it announced the findings of its 
investigation into the killing on 31 August last year of one 
Indonesian and two US citizens who were employees of the 
Freeport copper-and-gold mine who were on an outing with 
their families . The organisation suggested that members of 
Kopassus were the likely culprits. A similar conclusion was 
also reached by a police investigation. 
Initially the charge was laid against ELSHAM's director, 
Yohanis Bonay but it was subsequently broadened to include 
John Rumbiak, ELSHAM's supervisor who is now living 
abroad. Four others are also being charged, the Indonesian 
daily, Koran Tempo, the editor of Koran Tempo, Suara 
Karya, another Indonesian daily, as well as its editor. The 
lawsuit demands huge 'material' and 'immaterial' damages 
from ELSHAM, in a clear bid to force the organisation into 
liquidation. 
Yohanis Bonay responded to the army's announcement 
by saying that he was ready to defend the organisation in 
court and was confident of success. ELSHAM will be 
assisted by a powerful defence team of fifteen lawyers from 
Papua and Indonesia. 
This killing of Freeport employees is now under investi-
gation by the FBI. There is strong pressure in Washington 
for this incident to be thoroughly investigated and is likely 
to have an impact on decisions about future US aid to the 
Indonesian military. Survivors of the killing and relatives of 
the victims have lobbied members of Congress for a full 
investigation and for a moratorium on military assistance to 
Indonesia. 
Kopassus soldiers tried for Theys murder 




tribunal in Surabaya earl ier this year for their involvement 
in the murder of Theys Eluay, the leader of the Papuan 
Presidium Council who was abducted and killed on 10 
November 2001. They were the men who accompanied the 
Papuan leader on his way home from a reception at the local 
Kopassus base. They were charged and found guilty not of 
murder but of maltreatment resulting in the victim's death, 
when they stifled him, allegedly during an argument about 
his support for Papuan independence. Although this charge 
allows a sentence of up to seven years, the men were given 
sentences of between three and three-and-a-half years. 
The court proceedings were also a travesty in that no 
attempt was made to unearth the background to this high 
profile political assassination. 
Members of the Theys family were left with a sense of 
outrage at the injustice of the verdicts and they condemned 
the sentences as an insult. But General Ryamizard Ryacudu, 
chef-of-staff of the army, never a man to mince his bellicose 
language, later called the men 'heroes' who had carried out 
a legitimate act in defence of the unitary state of Indonesia. 
Infant mortality in Papua: 
the worst in the world 
A UNICEF official in Jakarta has expressed deep 
concern that the infant mortality rate in Papua has now 
reached 117 per 1,000 under-five children, which is the 
worst in the world. 
Kiyoshi Nakamitsu said: 'This means 117 out of every 
1,000 infants die every year before they reach the age of 
one year old. This infant mortality rate is very high, and 
much higher than the national rate of 50 per 1,000 
infants.' He added that UNICEF was obliged and had a 
responsibility to cope with the serious health problems 
among women and their children in the province. 
Kiyoshi said the high infant mortality rate had a lot to 
do with rampant malnutrition among women and their 
children, and the lack of health services, especially in 
remote areas. 
'Many infants are doomed to die because besides 
being malnourished, most children and women do not 
have access to better health services because of poverty 
and the fact that they live in remote areas,' he said. 
He said further that this had been worsened by the 
high percentage of people with HIV I AIDS in the province 
over the last decade. Out of a total of 1,263 people with 
HIV in the province, 539 have developed AIDS. If 
compared to the province's population of 2.3 million, this 
figure is the highest in the country. 
'The infant mortality rate is expected to remain high 
over the next ten years in line with the high percentage of 
people with HIV I AIDS. Prenatal babies are quite prone to 
contracting HIV/AIDS from their mothers.' 
If this trend continues, said Carmel Budiardjo of 
TAPOL, along with the influx of Indonesians into the 
province, Papuans who currently account for about 60 per 
cent of the population are on course to becoming a minor-
ity in their own country. * 
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The impact of BP's Tangguh project on Papua 
BP's proposed giant liquified natural gas (LNG) project in Bintuni Bay, West Papua - the Tangguh 
project - continues to cause concern for human rights and environmental organisations. BP's failure 
to make public their in-house report on the project's human rights impact has been condemned by 
NGOs. Any potential benefit to the people of Papua looks set to be undermined by the threat the project 
brings of increasing HIV/AIDS, inward migration, and militarisation - and thereby an increased risk 
of human rights violations. There is also the prospect of a controversial new World Bank loan. 
Tangguh is BP's proposed $2 billion LNG project, 
planned for the remote Bintuni Bay in the Birds Head 
region of West Papua. The project involves offshore gas 
platforms, pipelines and an onshore LNG processing plant. 
Gas will be shipped to export markets. Although there have 
been some delays in construction due to problems securing 
adequate gas contracts, a base camp has been built and work 
on a port and airstrip is underway. The project area is 3,416 
hectares, with 4,200 local people inhabiting the 'directly 
affected villages'. Indonesia has secured gas contracts with 
Japan and China, and is in negotiations over contracts with 
Taiwan, the Philippines, and Korea. 
Failure to publish Human Rights report 
In its communications with NGOs, BP has made much of 
its intentions to assess the potential impacts of the Tangguh 
project. To this end, and for the first time, the company 
commissioned a Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) 
report on the project. The report was written by two former 
US State Department officials. Much to the frustration of 
human rights organisations, BP never published the 70-page 
report - citing 'legal reasons' as the obstacle. No offer was 
made to publish or circulate a version with legally sensitive 
references removed. Instead, the company placed a five-
page 'Summary of recommendations' in the public domain, 
along with its own response to it. 
In February 2003, BP's refusal to disseminate the report 
led to Indonesia-focused human rights organisations -
including TAPOL - boycotting the company's London meet-
ing on Tangguh. An assessment ofBP's response document, 
which quotes selectively from the report, reveals some 
points of concern, but raises as many questions as answers. 
BP agrees with the human rights report that the 'balance' 
between human rights and security represents 'one of the 
most difficult challenges for the Tangguh Project'. [BP 
Response to HRIA Report, February 2003, p.17] Whilst the 
company clearly acknowledges the risk security provision 
represents for human rights, its approach to 'balance' human 
rights against other factors is highly questionable. Human 
rights should be upheld for all people, regardless of circum-
stance - not balanced against other, commerically driven 
objectives. BP also concedes the genuine risk of human 
rights abuses. The company expresses its 'hope' that the 
proposals for 'Community-Based Security' ... 'will reduce 
the risks of human rights incidents from taking place'. [Ibid. 
p.15] 
Under a section on 'Freedom of Opinion and Expression', 
the BP response notes that 'the report specifically discusses 
ELS-HAM, the Papua human rights NGO' - but fails to indi-
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cate why the report refers to ELS-HAM, or to engage with 
any issues that organisation may have raised as concerns. 
(Ibid. p.15] 
Also in relation to the security issue, the BP response 
notes that 'at present, as the [HRIA] report implies, there is 
considerable animosity among some of the various stake-
holders' [ibid. p.19] - yet there is no further elaboration. 
These examples indicate that the HRIA report identified 
some serious human rights concerns - but that keeping the 
report out of the public domain makes it virtually impossi-
ble for specific concerns to be assessed impartially. A 
company's expression of 'hope' that its own solutions will 
work is far from adequate - especially when assessing a 
commercial project's risk to human lives. 
A catalyst for militarisation 
As part of its Community-Based Security policy, the 
company has recruited 65 Papuans who are being trained 
internally for unarmed security work - and says it will not 
pay the military to guard the project. However, regardless 
of its intentions, the company's professed policy will not be 
able to stop the military and mobile police (Brimob) making 
use of Tangguh for their own ends. Interestingly, BP has 
stated that the project would not automatically be cancelled 
if the community approach to security failed to work. 
[Down To Earth (DTE), Update on BP's Tangguh LNG 
project, June 2003] 
BP has set up an independent panel to assess the 'non-
commerical' aspects of the project. The BP-funded 
Tangguh Independent Advisory Panel (TIAP) is made up of 
Senator George Mitchell, Lord David Hannay, Ambassador 
Sabam P. Siagian and Reverend Herman Saud. The panel's 
first report on the project described security as 'the most 
difficult and sensitive issue for BP'. [TIAP report, October 
2002, p. 20] The TIAP report specifically raises doubts 
over the viability of the Community-Based policy: "many 
believe this concept is unrealistic and that the TNI will 
insist on protecting this vital national asset at close range". 
[Ibid, p. 21, our emphasis] 
BP's plan to provide security from local, unarmed civil-
ians already risks being undermined by the reality of the 
situation in Papua. Indeed, the company is well aware of 
this situation, when it readily acknowledges not only that 
't~e provision of security is ultimately the exclusive prerog-
ative of the State; but also that 'the Indonesian security 
forces must be constructively involved - along with 
Tangguh's many other stakeholders'. [Ibid, p15, p17] 
The size of this mega-project, its status as a 'provit' - a 
projek vital or national (Indonesian) asset - and the fact that 
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the military are already heavily deployed in West Papua 
means that the security forces will clearly see themselves, 
like BP sees them, as stakeholders. But it is fanciful to 
think that they will not bring significant pressure to bear. 
This may manifest as demands for income or as military 
action to demonstrate to Jakarta the need for significant 
military deployment in the area - an objective likely to lead 
to the orchestration of 'security incidents'. 
Given the self-serving military, political and financial 
objectives of the Indonesian security forces [see related arti-
cles in this TAPOL Bulletin], the military remain in no 
mood to defend 'national vital assets' like Tangguh 'sensi-
tively'. Indeed a major Indonesian 'national asset' in Papua 
would, from the military's point of view, require significant 
military protection - and therefore an increase in military 
resources. 
The concern that Tangguh represents a catalyst for the 
militarisation of Papua has now been voiced internationally. 
The northern 2003 International Solidarity Meeting on West 
Papua (ISMWP), held in Brussels in June, gave the follow-
ing assessment in its statement: 'We are concerned that 
large-scale resource extraction by multinational corpora-
tions acts as a catalyst for militarisation and an increased 
risk of human rights violations.' The statement specifically 
mentioned BP. [Statement of the Fourth ISMWP(north), 
June 2003] 
The threat of HIV/AIDS 
The northern 2003 ISMWP also expressed its extreme 
concern that 'HIV I AIDS has reached crisis levels in West 
Papua' and is calling for greater action from development 
organisations'. [Ibid] 
When Tangguh begins its construction phase, up to 5,000 
workers will be employed in the Bintuni Bay area. Many 
will be migrant workers attracted to the area as a result of 
the project. The TIAP report draws attention to the likeli-
hood that migrants will bring 
HIV/AIDS into the area, as 
well as other contagious 
diseases and alcohol and drug 
use. 
As TIAP acknowledged, to 
deal with what could become a 
major health crisis, health care 
provision in these communi-
ties will become vital. [TIAP 
report, 2002, p25-6, p20] A 
major problem is that the 
greatest HIV I AIDS and health 
risk will be during the project's 
construction period - long 
before any revenue will flow 
to Papua from the project. If 
the project proceeds without 
significant advanced invest-
ment in appropriate healthcare 
the results could be disastrous. 
New debt for Papua? 
The question of the timeline 
for revenue flows to Papua 
raises other concerns. 
Revenues for Papua have been 
WEST PAPUA 
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estimated at between US$100m by 2016 up to a possible 
US$225m at the project's peak. However, TIAP points out 
that it may be 10 years before any potential revenues reach 
Papua. It proposes the development of a mechanism to 
even out revenue flows to Papua - bringing them forward to 
before the project enters its commercial production phase. 
BP's response to the proposal has been to suggest a World 
Bank loan - something which would place new debt burden 
on Papua, and would mean that Papua was effectively 
underwriting financial risk and investment in the project. 
This scenario risks Papua becoming 'locked in' to the 
project and a relationship with BP, and left to service a debt 
burden even if the project ran into difficulties. [DTE, 
Update on BP's Tangguh LNG project, June 2003; TIAP 
report, 2002, p.18; BP written response to TIAP report, 
2002, and information at TIAP meeting, March 2003] 
Investing in the violation of the right to 
self-determination 
As the international campaign for a UN Review of the so-
called 'Act of Free Choice' makes clear [see TAPOL Bulletin 
166-7], the people of West Papua have been systematically 
denied their human right to self-determination. As well as 
the longstanding denial of this basic human right, Papuans 
continue to suffer ongoing human rights abuses [see sepa-
rate article] by the Indonesian military. 
BP's project needs to be seen in this context. By devel-
oping an Indonesian national asset in West Papua - and all 
that this implies in terms of human rights and increased 
militarisation - are BP simply doing business as usual, or are 
they complicit in these violations? * 
Tangguh. Photo: Katie Wilson. 
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Wh_ere's the justice? 
There can no longer be any doubt that the proceedings in Indonesia's ad hoc human rights court 
for East Timor are a sham following the extraordinary decision by the prosecution to request the 
acquital of the highest-ranking defendant Major General Adam Damiri. The fate of Damiri is in 
sharp contrast to that of civilians killed in Aceh in atrocities reminiscent of East Timor and of anti-
government protestors thrown into jail in Jakarta/or the 'offence' of insulting the President. 
Little prospect of military accountability 
The series of trials in Jakarta of 18 defendants accused 
of crimes against humanity in East Timor before, during and 
after the independence ballot in August 1999 are likely to 
end soon with the acquital of the former regional military 
commander, Adam Damiri. 
The prosecution asked for the charges against Damiri to 
be dismissed because of the alleged lack of evidence against 
him. The formal verdict is due to be announced on 1 July. 
While an affront to justice, this development is perhaps 
not surprising given the abjeCt performance of the prosecu-
tors to date. They have ignored vital evidence, presented a 
false account of the events as a conflict between two violent 
East Timorese factions, and given the impression that they 
would prefer all the accused to escape punishment. 
Damiri has demonstrated his own contempt for the 
proceedings by taking time off from his trial to help prepare 
the armed forces for their war on Aceh. His arrogance and 
lack of concern for justice is a disturbing sign that the mili-
tary is enjoying a resurgence which has put it beyond the 
law. 
In recent months, the ad hoc court has convicted former 
East Timor commander, Brigadier-General Noer Muis of 
crimes against humanity and sentenced him to five years 
imprisonment, half the legal minimum, and acquited 
another former East Timor commander, Brigadier-General 
Tono Suratman. 
In the 17 concluded cases, the court has acquited 12 
defendants and convicted only five. All five have been 
given lenient sentences and remain free pending appeal. 
The lack of political will to challenge the power of the 
military and to push through meaningful legal reforms has 
meant that these outcomes were sadly inevitable. 
UN expert castigates legal system 
The extent of the crisis in the Indonesian justice system 
was made clear in a report, published in January, by the UN 
special rapporteur on the independence of judges and 
lawyers, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, following his visit to 
Indonesia in July 2002. 
Mr Cumaraswamy expressed concern about the 'lack of 
a culture of judicial independence' and 'widespread judicial 
corruption' which, he said, is not limited to the judiciary, but 
'spreads as cancer in the entire system, the judiciary, police, 
prosecutors and Office of the Attorney-General. He 
concluded that 'the slow pace with which the Government 
and DPR [parliament] are addressing the issues has called 
into question the political will of these institutions to deal 
with the situation on an urgent and priority basis'. 
He further suggested that restrictions on the jurisdiction 
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of the ad hoc court for East Timor amount to a 'violation of 
the principle that prosecutions are to be undertaken in good 
faith and with due diligence'. The several acquitals are not 
surprising given the 'insufficient investigations and the fail-
ure to produce material evidence,' he said. He expressed 
concern about 'the wholly unsatisfactory implementation of 
the witness protection measures'. 
Mr Cumaraswamy called for 'drastic, urgent and far-
reaching action' to tackle judicial corruption and for 'a holis-
tic approach to reforms of the judiciary, the entire prosecu-
torial system and the police force. He recommended that 
the Government should develop a plan, with the assistance 
of the international community, to ensure that future prose-
cutions of gross human rights violations reflect interna-
tional standards and practice'. 
UN Rights Commission betrays victims 
Serious flaws in the ad hoc trial process were also iden-
tified by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Sergio de Mello, in his report to the 59th session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in March. 
Mr de Mello - formerly the head of UNTAET in East 
Timor - referred to the 'insufficient investigations under-
taken by the Office of the Attorney-General' and the weak-
ness of the indictments. He rightly made the point that none 
of the defendants, except one, was accused of personally 
committing or commanding the commission of crimes 
against humanity. He stated that the failure to put before the 
court evidence that portrays the killings and other human 
rights violations as part of a widespread or systematic 
pattern of violence 'seriously undermines the strength of the 
prosecution's case and jeopardizes the integrity and credi-
bility of the trial process'. 
In the light of this, it is hard to understand why the 
Commission did nothing to ensure that the perpetrators of 
gross violations in East Timor are brought to justice. In an 
agreed Chairperson's Statement, the Commission merely 
expressed disappointment at the way in which the trials 
were being carried out. Its underlying message was that if 
improvements were made, the process would be acceptable. 
It ignored the many flaws in .the process, the limited juris-
diction of the court and the failure of the Indonesian author-
ities to investigate more than a handful of the hundreds of 
serious crimes committed in East Timor. 
At a special session in September 1999 the Commission 
h~d ~ondemned the _'widespread, systematic and gross 
v10lat1ons of human nghts and international humanitarian 
law' in East Timor, and called for those responsible to be 
brought to justice. Although there is currently no meaning-
ful prospect of accountability, the Commission perversely 
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dropped the issue from its agenda for future sessions. 
Next year, the Commission will consider only the ques-
tion of technical cooperation with East Timor in the field 
human rights. This will likely preclude any further consid-
eration of Indonesia's responsibility for the atrocities. 
Serious Crimes Unit delivers verdict on 
Jakarta justice 
On 24 February, the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) in East 
Timor - set up by the UN under UNTAET - delivered its 
own verdict on the Jakarta process and the authorities' fail-
ure to investigate the highest-ranking suspects, by filing 
indictments against former armed forces commander, 
General Wiranto, six other senior military officials and 
former civilian Governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares (one 
of the few convicted by the Jakarta court). 
This was a major development in the search for justice 
for East Timor, but predictably Indonesia stated that it 
would refuse to transfer the accused to East Timor. 
The response of the East Timorese leadership was also 
less than helpful. President Xanana Gusmao issued a state-
ment saying that the process was not in East Timor's 
national interest and Foreign Minister Jose Ramos Horta, on 
a visit to Jakarta at the begininning of March, indicated that 
relations with Jakarta were more important than justice. 
Concerned about the lack of political support for the 
serious crimes process, the International Federation for East 
Timor (IFET), of which TAPOL is a member, ~ote ~o the 
President on 1 April, expressing support for his des1fe _to 
promote reconciliation and ~oo~ relations wi~h Indone_sia, 
but pointing out that those objectives were not i?comp~ti~le 
with the pursuit of justice and should not be given pnonty 
over justice. 
IFET argued that Indonesia w?uld b~ 'stren1?thene~ as a 
nation if it confronts the issue of impumty and m particular 
the responsibility of its armed forces for gross violations in 
[East Tim or]'. 
It also expressed the fear that the Presiden_t's respon~e. to 
the indictments could encourage the Indonesian authonties 
to ignore numerous other gross _viol~tions perpetrated in 
Indonesia. 'The people of Indonesia.will n?t ~~ we_ll served 
by the continued protection of TNI impumty, it _said .. 
IFET agreed with the President that East Timor is not 
able to provide justice on its own. It pledged to press. the 
international community and the UN to support the senous 
crimes process, both politically and with the necessary 
resources now and after the expiration of the current UN 
mission, UNMISET, in May 2004. It said it would als? u:ge 
the international community to find other ways of brmgmg 
the perpetrators to justice including the establ~shme?t of_an 
international criminal tribunal and prosecutions m third 
countries under universal jurisdiction provisions. . , 
On 20 May 2003 - the first anniversary of East Timo.r s 
independence - IFET wrote to m~mbers of t~e UN ~ecunty 
Council calling upon the Council to esta~hsh an mterna-
tional tribunal. It also asked the Council to extend ~he 
mandate of the SCU and the associated special court, saymg 
that the 'work of the SCU would serve as a solid basis for 
an ad hoc international tribunal. 
[The texts of IFET's letters are available at 
www.etan.org/ifet] 
East Timor's prime minister, Mari Alkatiri, has been 
more forceful in pressing for international justice. In May, 
I 
! JUSTICE AND TRIALS 
I 
i 
in an interview with the Asia Times he said: 'Crimes against 
humanity must be judged ... and the internatio~al c~mmu­
nity has primary responsibility .. . We cannot JUSt i1?nore 
crimes against humanity, which are the gravest of crimes, 
yet take petty thieves to court. It would be a travesty of 
justice' [Asia Times, 15 May 2003]. . 
He subsequently criticised the Jakarta tria~s ('The~ are 
like a piece of theater') and called for an mternational 
tribunal in a neutral country [AP, 30 May 2003; UNMISET, 
local media monitoring, 30 May]. 
This issue is not just about the views of the East 
Timorese government or any other govemm~nt~ however. !t 
is also about the East Timorese people, the victims and their 
families and about the Indonesian victims of military 
violence. And it is about the need to uphold human rights 
and the supremacy of international law. The i~ternational 
community, not the East Timore.se govei:nm~nt,_ is therefore 
ultimately responsible for ensurmg that Justice is done. 
Beyond impunity? . . . 
There is growing concern in Indonesia that impunity -
exemplified by the Jakarta trials - is now so entrenched that 
increased militarisation of the country is inevitable. 
This was a major concern of the international solidarity 
movement for West Papua (North) meeting in Brussels from 
6-8 June. The movement has written an open letter to 
members of the international community expressing grave 
concern about the impact of the Jakarta trials on the unac-
countable power of the military. 
The letter expressed the movement's fear that 'increased 
militarisation and violence in areas such as West Papua and 
Aceh will result from the legal system's failure to challenge 
the power of the military'. It argues that 'sus.t~inable ~ea~e 
will not be achieved as long as the authorities persist m 
pursuing the military solution to political p~oblem~ an~ do 
nothing to bring the perpetrators of human nghts violations 
to justice'. . . . .. 
With many innocent civilians now bemg killed ir;i m~h­
tary operations in Aceh and West Papua, the need for Justice 
to triumph over impunity is more urgent than ever. * 
continued from p 17 
Six of the companies were Korean, operating without 
Indonesian partners. One of the other two was Japanese 
which was a joint venture with an Indonesian company while 
the other was from China. 
In a recent case, 300 workers employed by a garment 
factory in East Jakarta, were sacked before their salaries and 
severance pay had been paid. In this case, the ~ompany's 
machinery and assets were handed over for auction by the 
state industrial park where the factory is located before any 
settlement was reached with the workers. Speaking on behalf 
of the workers, Agustinus Santoso of the People's Legal ~id 
Bureau said they would be pressing the customs and excise 
department to issue a decree forcing the the company to J?ay 
outstanding expences, including salaries, before the auction 
took place. 
Santoso said that labour activists and experts had come 
together in a coalition to press for a regulation that would 
prevent foreign investors from fleeing the country and clos-
ing their factories before paying salaries and severance pay. 
[Jakarta Post, 26 March 2003] * 
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ARMS SALES 
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Hawk jets used in Aceh war 
On 19 May, British-made Hawk jets helped launch Indonesia's war in Aceh in clear breach of 
'assurances' that British equipment would not be used for offensive purposes. A British minister 
dispatched to Jakarta to protest was snubbed by military chiefs who insisted they had paid for the 
jets and if necessary would use them to 'complete the job' in Aceh. 
On the first day of the military offensive, four Hawk-200 
fighter jets were used to escort transport planes carrying 
troops to Aceh and to scare and intimidate people on the 
ground. 
Subsequent reports indicated that the aircraft were being 
used to attack and bomb villages although it is increasingly 
difficult to verify these reports due to the tight control exer-
cised by the Indonesian military over the media and civil 
society in Aceh. 
Military spokesmen have, however, confirmed that the 
jets are being used as part of 'shock therapy' tactics to send 
'sonic booms' across the province. 
Thirteen Scorpion tanks made by the British arms manu-
facturer Alvis are also among the equipment deployed to 
Aceh as is equipment from the US, France, Germany, 
Russia, and South Korea. 
Strong protests by TAPOL and the London-based 
Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) prompted a clearly-
embarrassed British Government - no doubt anxious to 
preserve military relations with Indonesia - to arrange a 
hasty visit to Jakarta by Foreign Office minister, Mike 
O'Brien. He warned the Indonesian government that mili-
tary ties might be affected if British equipment is used in 
Aceh, but military chiefs insisted they have the right to use 
the Hawks in combat operations if required. 
A commitment by the British Government to monitor 
the use of British equipment and to follow up allegations of 
misuse conveniently misses the point that the very deploy-
ment of the equipment to Aceh is unacceptable and in 
breach of 'assurances' given by Indonesia that the equip-
ment will not be used offensively, for counter-insurgency 
purposes, or to suppress human rights. 
'Assurances' worthless 
TAPOL has long campaigned against 
arms sales to Indonesia and has insisted 
that Indonesia's 'assurances' are worthless 
given its record of repeatedly using 
imported weaponry in East Timor, Aceh 
and West Papua and against its own citi-
zens. 
Indonesian officials are now asserting 
that the 'assurances' are no more than non-
binding gentlemens' agreements. Former 
Defence minister, Juwono Sudarsono -
likely to be named soon as Indonesia's 
new ambassador to Britain - said: 'As I see 
it, once the weapons have been sold, 
Indonesia should not be expected to abide 
by restrictive conditions on their 
use ... Conditions should not be made 
binding, except as part of a gentleman's 
agreement'. 
Successive British governments have hidden behind 
these worthless assurances because ultimately the perceived 
commercial value of arms sales overrides official concerns 
about human rights and the lives of ordinary people in 
affected areas. We hope that this disgraceful charade has 
been exposed by the unrepentant use of British equipment 
in the Aceh war. 
Despite announcing an 'ethical dimension' to its foreign 
policy and introducing new arms export licencing guide-
lines after it came to power in May 1997, Tony Blair's 
Labour government resisted strong pressure to revoke 
export licences granted by the previous Conservative 
administration for the equipment now being used in Aceh. 
The delivery of 16 Hawk-200 aircraft worth £160 million 
and 50 Scorpion tanks worth £80 million was allowed to go 
ahead despite evidence that similar equipment had previ-
ously been used for internal repression and against East 
Timorese civilians [see 'No end to British arms sales', 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 143, p. 7]. 
On 23 May, around 25-30 people, including Acehnese in 
the UK, demonstrated outside the Foreign Office against the 
war in Aceh. A dramatic mock-up of a Hawk aircraft, and 
numerous banners and placards underlined the protesters' 
call for an end to the war and their condemnation of Tony 
Blair's government for allowing British arms to be used to 
suppress human rights and to destroy the peace process in 
the province. The event was organised jointly by TAPOL 
and CAAT. * 
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Call for military embargo 
Campaigners around the world are outraged that equipment sold by their governments is being 
used in a bloody campaign in Aceh which will inevitably lead to widespread civilian loss of life. 
They fear similar consequences for West Papua and are calling for a military embargo on 
Indonesia. More than 90 organisations have signed up to the following statement: 
We are organisations and groups concerned about 
human rights in Indonesia and about the adverse impact on 
human rights of Indonesia's military relations with other 
countries. This statement arises out of our alarm at the 
complete deterioration of conflict resolution and military 
reform efforts in Indonesia and the concurrent rise in the 
Indonesian military's lawlessness and brutality. Recent 
developments include: 
* the massive military offensive in Aceh following the 
Indonesian Government's declaration of martial law on 19 
May 2003; 
* an ongoing military campaign currently underway in 
the Central Highlands of Papua; 
* the Indonesian military's failure to cooperate with 
independent investigations into its suspected involvement 
in the 31 August 2002 killing of one Indonesian and two 
American schoolteachers inside the Freeport copper & gold 
mining project area in Papua; 
* the military's well-documented assassination of 
respected and non-violent community leaders and its perpe-
tration of numerous massacres in Papua, East Timor and 
Aceh and its failure to engage constructively in peace initia-
tives such as the establishment of Papua as a Land of Peace; 
* military training and funding of violent militias in 
Aceh and Papua; 
* military noncooperation with Indonesia's ad hoc 
human rights court on East Timor; 
* draft legislation prepared by the Indonesian military 
(TNI) that grants it authority to carry out operations without 
prior presidential order; and 
* the TNI's continuing resistance to budgetary trans-
parency and proper civilian oversight of its finances. 
The TNI, which has not needed to defend Indonesia 
against an external attack for 40 years, has regularly used 
weaponry and combat skills obtained in part through 
foreign training and military assistance programs against 
civilians, including Indonesians, East Timorese, West 
Papuans, Acehnese and others. 
The military offensive in Aceh, which is Indonesia's 
largest military operation since the invasion of East Timor 
in 1975, is now proceeding at a level that is causing wide-
spread civilian loss of life and the destruction of Aceh's 
public infrastructure. Human rights groups fear massive 
violations of human rights and are especially concerned 
about the safety of human rights defenders and civil society 
activists. Numerous reports of extra-judicial killings and 
torture are emerging from Aceh, including of students and 
boys as young as 12. Several NGOs have been forced 
underground because of dire warnings from the Martial 
Law Authority. Their activists have been threatened with 
arrest and as a result many have gone into hiding. Acehnese 
communities are being targeted in Jakarta and other cities 
outside Aceh. In an attempt to isolate Aceh and suppress the 
truth about the war, the Government has banned foreign aid 
workers and international NGOs from entering Aceh and 
rendered the position of those already there extremely tenu-
ous. It has imposed severe restrictions on press freedom. 
Tens of thousands of people have been internally displaced 
and villagers are afraid to tend their land. The military says 
it plans to forcibly relocate up to 200,000 civilians. The UN 
has expressed concern about a looming humanitarian crisis 
as food supplies run dangerously low. 
In Papua, the military continues to provoke situations 
designed to strengthen its power there and to undermine 
peace and stability in the territory. Indonesian special forces 
(Kopassus) personnel, presumably carrying out orders from 
the military leadership, assassinated popular Papuan 
community leader Theys H. Eluay in November 2001. In 
April of this year, Kopassus and other military units 
launched a widespread operation in Papua's Central 
Highlands, causing more than one thousand villagers to flee 
their homes. The military have detained pastors, human 
rights defenders and others, one 35-year-old detainee has 
died whilst in custody, and additional deaths among inter-
nally displaced civilians suffering from lack of food and 
shelter have been reported. 
Although there have been strenuous efforts by the US 
administration to restore full military ties with Indonesia in 
furtherance of the "war against terror", and President Bush 
has thanked President Megawati for her co-operation, the 
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed on 21 
May 2003 to reinstate a ban on military training for FY 
2004 unless the administration certifies that the Indonesian 
Government is co-operating fully with the FBI investigation 
into the killings in the Freeport project area in August 2002. 
Indonesian police and NGO investigations have implicated 
the TNI in the attack. 
The TNI is infamous for its brutality and lack of 
accountability in areas of conflict. The Indonesian Police, 
especially the special forces known as Brimob, also has an 
appalling human rights record. 
In September 1999, the US imposed restrictions on arms 
exports and military relations with Indonesia following the 
TNI's campaign of murder and mayhem in East Timor. The 
EU introduced similar restrictions at the same time, but they 
were lifted after four months. 
There has been no meaningful progress towards reform 
of the military or the ending of impunity in the intervening 
period. On the contrary, the TNI is seeking to enhance its 
political role. The proceedings at Indonesia's ad hoc human 
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rights court on East Timor have helped to entrench impunity 
rather than end it. Recently, the most senior officer charged 
with crimes against humanity, Major-General Adam Damiri 
missed several days of his trial in order to help prepare the 
TNI for its assault on Aceh. 
Military equipment supplied by other countries - espe-
cially the US, the UK, Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands - is now being used by the TNI in Aceh and has 
been used extensively in Papua and East Timor in the past. 
We hold those countries complicit in any attacks with such 
equipment on civilians and regard those countries as acces-
sories to consequent breaches of human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law. 
Although there is currently a ban on the transfer of US 
weapons to Indonesia, the TNI is using weapons supplied 
before the ban. OV-10 Bronco counter-insurgency planes 
are rocketing villages in Aceh while C-130 Hercules trans-
port aircraft have dropped hundreds of paratroopers over 
the region. Indonesia is preparing other US equipment for 
use, including F-16 fighter jets, S-58 Twinpack helicopters 
and numerous small arms. 
British-supplied Hawk aircraft and Scorpion tanks have 
been deployed to the area. The Hawks are reportedly being 
used to attack and bomb villages. Government ministers 
and TNI spokesmen have said that they have no intention of 
complying with assurances given to Britain that the equip-
ment would not be used for counter-insurgency purposes, 
for offensive operations or to suppress human rights. 
Warships from the former East Germany, sold by 
Germany, have also been deployed to Aceh and may be 
used in a naval blockade of ports there in violation of 
contractual restrictions stating that they would not be used 
in any domestic conflict. There is evidence that French 
AMX-VCI and Russian PT-76s, BTR-50s, and BMP-2s 
armoured vehicles are also being used. Russia recently 
signed a deal to supply four Sukhoijet fighters and two MI-
35 helicopters to Indonesia. 
Other countries with significant military ties with 
Indonesia include Australia, which is pushing to resume 
relations with Kopassus, Poland which is planning exten-
sive co-operation in the field of military relations and arms 
sales, the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. Some govern-
ments are seeking to restore and expand training for 
members of the TNI and to collaborate with the TNI in 
seminars and conferences as well as joint exercises. 
We are convinced that the TNI represents a grave threat 
to the stability and security oflndonesia and we believe that 
the policy of western countries to strengthen their military 
ties with Jakarta as part of the "war against terror" is wholly 
misguided and dangerous. Given the backdrop of mounting 
casualties, wanton killings and human rights abuses attrib-
utable to the TNI in Aceh and Papua, we believe it is intol-
erable for governments to engage with the TNI on a busi-
ness-as-usual basis. 
We therefore call upon all governments to: 
1. Impose an embargo on the supply of military, security 
and police equipment to Indonesia, to include contracts 
agreed before the entry into force of the embargo; 
2. Insist on the withdrawal from Aceh of all military 
equipment they have previously supplied to Indonesia; 
3. Suspend all forms of co-operation with the Indonesian 
military and police special forces to include training, partic-
ipation in seminars and conferences, joint exercises and 
26 
senior level military exchanges; 
4. Press the Indonesian Government to end the military 
operations in Aceh and to resolve the conflict by means of 
peaceful dialogue, and to halt military operations in Papua 
and withdraw the special forces troops now operating in the 
Central Highlands. 
June 2003 
HIV sufferers demand 
government help 
The question of HIV/ AIDS is not one that is publicly 
discussed in Indonesia, but things may be changing. 
Hundreds of people took part in a demonstration in 
Jakarta in May demanding that the government disburse 
Rp 4.8 billion ($539,325) as promised to help people with 
HIV/AIDS who need to buy antiretroviral (ARV) drugs. 
The protest was backed by the Pelita Ilmu Foundation, a 
support group for people living with HIV/AIDS. 
A co-founder of the foundation, the immunologist 
Samsuridjal Djauzi, said that the Minister of Health, 
Achmad Suyudi had promised in March to subsidise all 
people with the condition to the tune of Rp 200,000 a 
month to help purchase the drug, which is essential to 
minimise the likelihood of infection which could cause 
opportunistic diseases to spread. 
ARV drugs are produced in the US, but at a prohibi-
tive price. India is now able to replicate the drugs without 
the need for extensive research making them much 
cheaper. 
Samsuridjal said that 'financial aid is crucial as many 
people have been fired from their workplaces, once it has 
been discovered that they are living with HIV/AIDS.' 
Many companies are now refusing to except such people. 
One person who took part in the demonstration said 
that she had been laid off work in February 2002 and had 
no source of income since then. There is no social secu-
rity at all in Indonesia for the unemployed. Yanti said that 
the monthly cost of drugs, counselling, tests and 
painkillers was Rp 650,000. She now lives at a treatment 
centre run by the Pelita Ilmu Foundation. 
It is estimated that 120,000 to 190,000 Indonesians 
are living with HIV/AIDS, most of whom acquired the 
conditions due to sharing unsterilised needles for intra-
venous drug use. This figure clearly understates the prob-
lem as an unknown number of people have failed to report 
their condition for fear of being stigmatised at work. 
As reported elsewhere in this Bulletin, the highest 
incidence of HIV I AIDS is ·in Papua which, with a popu-
lation of 2.4 million, accounts for 34 per cent of the 
national total [Jakarta Post, 19 May 2003]. 
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Problems bedevil Indonesian workers 
With the Indonesian economy still in the doldrums following the financial crisis in the late 1990s, 
Indonesian workers confront a host of problems. Millions, mostly women, seek jobs abroad but suffer 
indignities from their employers while the Indonesian government does little to give them the support 
they need. A new labour law has been strongly criticised by many unions for siding with employees and 
investors. Discrimination in the workplace is widespread and safety in the workplace is the worst in 
Southeast Asia. 
Unemployment and under-employment in Indonesia 
currently amounts to close on forty million people and 2.5 
million enter the labour market each year. Millions of 
jobless Indonesian workers have been seeking jobs abroad, 
and their earnings sent back home are a major source of 
foreign exchange for the country. 
Hundreds of thousands have obtained work in Malaysia, 
large numbers of whom are undocumented and regarded as 
'illegal'. Even larger numbers, mostly women, have 
obtained jobs in the Middle East. It is estimated that there 
are some two million Indonesians working in the Middle 
East of whom seventy per cent are housemaids. [The 
Jakarta Post, 26 July, 2002] 
A major crisis erupted in July 2002 when the Malaysian 
government announced a clampdown on undocumented 
Indonesian labourers and their employers. Those who failed 
to leave the country within the appointed time would be 
caned, heavily fined or given prison sentences, while those 
harbouring them would also be severely punished. 
According to Indonesian official figures in mid-2002, the 
number of workers living illegally in Malaysia was 180,000 
but others say the figure is more than double that, even, 
according to some, amounting to 480,000. [The Jakarta 
Post, 31 July, 2002] 
As the deadline set by Kuala Lumpur approached, tens 
of thousands of workers arrived in various places in North 
Sumatra as well as in East Kalimantan, across the border 
from Borneo. As an indication of the lack of preparedness 
of the Indonesian authorities, many were hastily transported 
back to Indonesia in warships. 
Then came the ugly spectacle of workers stranded in 
hastily constructed camps in Indonesia with local adminis-
trations being told - and in many cases refusing - to fund 
their upkeep and pay for transportation to their home 
villages. Tens of thousands of workers who were stranded 
for several weeks in Nunukan, East Kalimantan, close to the 
East Malaysian border, faced a humanitarian crisis because 
of the lack of basic facilities and medical care. 
Domestic workers overseas protest 
The plight of Indonesian women workers overseas came 
to light when thousands protested against a decision by the 
Hong Kong government in February this year to impose a 
tax on migrant domestic workers. Over 70,000 of Hong 
Kong's migrant domestic workers are from Indonesia, with 
the number increasing by 20 per cent each year. By the very 
nature of their work, these women are hidden from public 
view and scrutiny and vulnerable to physical, psychological 
and sexual abuse. 
A meeting in Hong Kong attended by representatives of 
trade unions, NGOs, workers' associations and migrant 
domestic workers discussed the abuses they suffer and what 
can be done to protect their rights. Their problems are 
compounded by the treatment they suffer at the hands of 
unscrupulous agencies which recruit the women at home. 
While awaiting their placement overseas, the women are 
required to live in camps run by the agencies where condi-
tions are harsh; they are locked in, underfed and are 
required to work for extremely low pay. In many cases, they 
remain in these camps for up to a year. 
The migrant workers are charged HK$21. ,000 
(US$2,700) for a placement, leaving them heavily in debt 
when they start earning a wage. According to the 
Indonesian Migrant Workers' Union and Asian Migrant 
Centre, nearly half the Indonesian domestic workers in 
Hong Kong are paid between HK$1,500-2,000 a month 
which is half the legal minimum wage. Because of the 
requirement to repay the money they owe to the agency, 
they earn virtually nothing for the first seven months in a 
job. Having to pay a monthly tax of HK$400 will make 
matters even worse. [Anti-Slavery International, April 
2003] 
Women domestics working in the Middle East are 
denied any rights as workers as they are considered to be 
part of their employer's extended family. This has led to 
conflict within the Megawati government between the 
Minister for Women's Empowerment, Sri Redjeki 
Sumaryoto, and the Minister for Labour, Jacob Nuwa Wea. 
Sri Redjeki was so concerned about the lack of rights for 
migrant workers that she called on the labour minister to 
suspend the sending of female workers to the Middle East 
until proper arrangements were made for their protection. 
'They should have lawyers to provide legal aid for troubled 
workers, including suing employers who mistreat or harass 
them,' she said in a letter to Jacob Nuwa Wea. 
Over the past five years, Indonesian women employed 
in the Middle East have been caned or sentenced to death 
for alleged sex scandals with their employers. Thousands 
have left their jobs because of ill-treatment, often ending up 
as prostitutes. [The Jakarta Post, 2 July 2002] 
Only recently, it has come to light that 5,000 Indonesian 
women migrant workers in Malaysia have been trapped by 
a trafficking syndicate into working as prostitutes. The 
Indonesian consul-general in Tawao, Sabah, admitted 
recently while on a trip to Indonesia that this has been going 
on now for almost a year. [The Jakarta Post, 15 February 
2003] 
They bear yet a further burden because, according to a 
ministerial decree of 2002, workers who complete a 
contract and wish to enter into a new contract in the coun-
try where they are working are required to return home and 
remain in Indonesia for at least thirty days before signing a 
new contract. This means going through the whole proce-
dure of a new placement and paying the agency fee again, 
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putting them into debt yet again for seven months. Migrant 
workers from other Asian countries are not required by their 
governments to do any such thing. [The Jakarta Post, 19 
April, 2003] 
In April this year, a group of migrant workers filed a 
lawsuit against President Megawati Sukarnoputri and her 
government for their failure to provide support to the 
hundreds of thousands of workers who were expelled from 
Malaysia last year. Instead of demanding compensation, the 
plaintiffs have asked the court to enact a law on migrant 
protection and to ratify UN conventions on migrant work-
ers. [Jakarta Post, 1 April 2003] 
Safety conditions the worst in SE Asia 
In a report published earlier this year, the International 
Labour Organisation said that safety conditions for 
Indonesian workers were the worst in Southeast Asia. It 
said that during the first six months of 2002, there were no 
fewer than 57,000 accidents in companies across the coun-
try, which is the equivalent of 300 accidents a day. The 
figures were based on a report by the Indonesian 
Occupational Safety and Health Council, but the report did 
not include figures for the number of fatalities. 
According to Soekotjo Joedoatmodjo, chair of the 
Indonesian National Health and Safety Council, the main 
reason for very poor safety standards was the leniency and 
lack of enforcement of safety measures, which put the lives 
of millions of workers at risk, particularly those working in 
hazard-prone workplaces. 'By the end of 2002, only 80 
companies out of a total of 170,000 in the country have 
been granted zero accident certification.' The number of 
companies applying minimum standards for a safe working 
environment is clearly a disgrace. 
The minimum standard for obtaining certification 
includes an environment that is free from piercing noise, 
ultraviolet radiation and electromagnetic energy that could 
be hazardous to workers' health. But, we would add, proper 
protection against injury by machinery operated by workers 
also presents a serious risk to workers. One official at the 
Manpower Ministry blames companies for their lack of 
compliance with safety standards. 'The high number of 
mishaps in the workplace is due to the lack of implementa-
tion of the already toothless regulation,' said Slamet Ichsan, 
the ministry official. Moreover, punishment for companies 
who violate the regulations is lenient in the extreme. 
Companies are only required to pay a fine of Rp 1 million 
($900), serve a one-month prison sentence, or both. 
[Jakarta Post, 10 January 2003] 
The ILO has called for joint efforts to improve workers' 
safety. 'A strong safety and health culture in all enterprises 
is a key to preventing both occupational death and disease,' 
it said. 
The workers' social insurance company PT Jamsostek 
reported earlier that the number of accidents during the 
whole of 2001 was 104,000, with more than one thousand 
fatalities; hundreds of workers suffered permanent injuries 
as a result of accidents. [Jakarta Post, 28 April 2003] 
Discrimination in the workplace 
The ILO has also published figures about discrimination 
in the workplace which reveal a grim picture, especially for 
women who represent such a high proportion of the 
Indonesian workforce. Discrimination against women 
workers was very great and was on the rise, according to the 
ILO. Figures from the Central Bureau of Statistics show 
that average female income was only 68 per cent of male 
salaries. Among white collar workers, female university 
graduates were earning 25 per cent less than their male 
counterparts, while the number of women in senior manage-
ment positions was far below men. 
Alongside gender discrimination, there is also age 
discrimination: those between 15 and 29 years worked 46 
hours a week for an average salary of Rp 386,000 ($43) a 
month while those in the age group 40 to 54, worked 42 
hours a week for Rp 682,000 a month. 
There was also discrimination against different ethnic 
groups, against people living with HIV/AIDS, the disabled 
as well as people of different religions. 
Responding to the ILO report, Dita Indah Sari, chair of 
the FNPBI (National Front for Indonesian Workers' 
Struggle), said this discrimination was the result of the poor 
implementation of labour regulations and the weakness of 
the trade union movement. 
'Women are still the main victims of discrimination at 
work, which is not only about salary but also (about) treat-
ment.' Another problem to which she drew attention was the 
wide gap between the lowest-paid and the highest-paid 
employees. In Indonesia, the salary gap now stands at 
1: 150, while in Malaysia it is 1 :28 and in Japan, it is 1 :9. 
[Jakarta Post, 19 May, 2003] 
In an attempt to rectify the situation, Manpower 
Minister Jacob Nuwa Wea said the government would have 
to increase the number of supervisors at companies from 
one to 1,000 companies as at present to one per 50 compa-
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